Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Annual Report 2025 German Bundestag

Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Annual Report 2025 German Bundestag

Annual Report 2025 from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces

Submitted with the letter of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces of 3 March 2026 pursuant to Section 2 (1) of the Act on the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces. German Bundestag Printed paper 21/4200 21st electoral term 3 March 2026

Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Annual Report 2025 (67th Report)

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 3 – Printed paper 21/4200 Table of contents Page Foreword …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6 The year under review in brief………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 1. Alliance and operations ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 9 Troop commitments …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 9 Protecting the alliance on NATO’s eastern flank …………………………………………………………………………………. 9 Lithuania …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 9 Poland …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….11 International crisis management ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..11 Iraq and Jordan ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..11 Lebanon …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..12 Kosovo …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….12 Financial ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..13 Voting in the Bundestag election ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….13 2. The Bundeswehr’s financial resourcing ………………………………………………………………………….. 14 3. New military service ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15 4. Personnel ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17 Personnel budget developments ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..17 Personnel situation …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..17 Personnel and application processing …………………………………………………………………………………………………18 Personnel recruitment ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………19 Public relations and information activities……………………………………………………………………………………………………19 Applications ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..21 Digitalisation of the application and scheduling process ………………………………………………………………………………..22 Advice and counselling in the careers centres ……………………………………………………………………………………………….22 Sustainable recruitment ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..23 Reinstatements and lateral entry …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………23 Personnel retention ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….25 Re-enlistment ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………25 Transfer to career soldier status………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….25 Civilian initial and follow-on occupational training ………………………………………………………………………………………25 Bonuses …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..26 Higher education ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………26 Internal labour market ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………27 Period of service reduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………27 Postponement of retirement ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..28 Military performance evaluation system …………………………………………………………………………………………….28 Promotions ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..30 Security clearance ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………31 5. Voluntary military service ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 33 6. Reserves ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 34 Home defence forces ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….36 Assurance of livelihood and other benefits ………………………………………………………………………………………….37 7. Women in the armed forces …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 38

Printed paper 21/4200 – 4 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term 8. Materiel ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 40 Clothing and personal equipment ………………………………………………………………………………………………………40 Drones …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..42 Digitalisation of Land-based Operations (D-LBO) ………………………………………………………………………………43 9. Bureaucracy and efficiency …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 43 Procurement ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………45 Process management ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..45 10. Infrastructure ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 47 11. Leadership development and civic education ………………………………………………………………….. 51 Camaraderie ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………52 Initial training …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………52 Violation of the free democratic basic order………………………………………………………………………………………..53 Offences against sexual self-determination …………………………………………………………………………………………56 Paratroopers ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………58 Secondary employment in the Medical Service ……………………………………………………………………………………58 Military participation ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….59 Lifesaving acts and acts to help others ……………………………………………………………………………………………….59 Accidents ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….60 12. Administration of justice and legal offences ……………………………………………………………………. 60 Bundeswehr disciplinary and complaints courts and Armed Forces’ Disciplinary Attorney ………………………60 Processing Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces matters ………………………………………………….61 De facto military service …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..61 Moral harassment ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………62 Alcohol ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….62 Ammunition and weapons losses ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….63 Crimes against the Bundeswehr …………………………………………………………………………………………………………63 13. Compatibility of family and duty ……………………………………………………………………………………… 64 Commuter issues……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..64 Family-friendly assignment planning …………………………………………………………………………………………………64 Flexible working time models and conditions ……………………………………………………………………………………..65 Childcare………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..65 Family support ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..66 Preparing for national and alliance defence …………………………………………………………………………………………67 14. Diversity …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 67 15. Health …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 68 Medical treatment ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………68 Paramedical personnel skills preservation …………………………………………………………………………………………..69 Disablement pension ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..70 Mission-related injury ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………71 Suicide …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..71 16. Welfare …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 72 Veterans Day ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….72

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 5 – Printed paper 21/4200 Military chaplaincy ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….72 Financial ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..73 MWR food service…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..75 Sport ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..76 17. Cases and petitions: Statistical overviews ………………………………………………………………………. 77 18. Visits, meetings and talks by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces ……… 84 19. Legal basis of the office, duties and tasks of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces and servicewomen and servicemen’s right of petition ……………………. 84 20. Organisational chart of the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 92

Printed paper 21/4200 – 6 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term Foreword “As an auxiliary organ of the German Bundestag, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces performs parliamentary oversight duties and submits a written general report to the Bundestag for each calendar year (cf. §§ 1 (1) and 2 (1) of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Act).” I was elected to this office by the German Bundestag on 21 May 2025, and thus accepted it with gratitude, respect and a healthy portion of humility, and I will endeavour to execute it with my full commitment and strength. Following 20 years as a member of the German Bundestag’s Defence Committee, it is a special honour for me to now represent our servicewomen and men as their ombudsman. My predecessor, Dr Eva Högl, was simply outstanding during her time in office, for which, and for the collegial handover of the position, I would like to thank her warmly. The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces is a special institution with incredible employees, whom I would like to expressly thank for their swift and trusting acceptance of my person and their consistently professional and meticulous work. The processing of more than 4,000 cases in the 2025 year under review exemplifies their impressive commitment. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces protects the rights of service personnel and supports parliament in its monitoring of the armed forces. Furthermore, I also see myself as a spokesperson for our servicewomen and men to voice their concerns to parliament and the general public, and at the same time as a driving force for political action – with the goal of further strengthening leadership development and civic education, and further improving the operational readiness and service conditions of our armed forces personnel. The security policy situation has changed fundamentally, and Germany is now confronted with a real and immediate threat, with alliances once thought to be secure now subject to change. In such times society both puts its trust in and places extraordinary expectations on the performance of our women and men in uniform. Our Bundeswehr is a strong parliamentary army, that accepts and performs its missions with the utmost responsibility and conscientiousness, and with justified pride. But of course our servicewomen and men require reliable framework conditions to be able to perform their duties to the best of their ability. Along with additional personnel, modern equipment and an improved infrastructure, this also requires the backing and clear support of the body politic and society as a whole, and in this respect I would like to emphasise our Veterans Day in particular, which was held for the first time in the year under review – a visible sign of the recognition, respect and gratitude due. The main event at the Reichstag in Berlin, the seat of our parliament, was an important signal to demonstrate our appreciation for the troops. So, visibility where it belongs – front and centre in society. Defence policy must not be thought of in terms of legislative periods or constrained by party politics. It must be oriented on the security policy situation. Our country’s overall defence and the protection of our free democratic basic order are permanent, collective national tasks, which now, more than ever, require cross-departmental and inter-ministerial recognition and awareness. The challenges we face demand clarity and determination from politicians and the body politic. Over the course of 2025 the members of the German Bundestag have achieved much for the operational readiness and protection of our servicewomen and men. The Federal Government has also implemented important measures to strengthen our military defence capability, and continues to move in the right direction. It is now crucial that we have the courage to face the truth, in order to ensure political goals also become military reality. Announcements and notices must be reflected in operational readiness, and thus in structures, equipment and support. Responsibility is indivisible, and in such challenging times the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces has an even greater duty to ensure their contribution as part of Germany’s security architecture. The Commissioner’s Annual Report therefore must not be understood as a defects report, as it identifies challenges, problems and areas of action, and connects them with conclusions and recommendations. Only when difficulties are addressed transparently can we create the basis to develop joint solutions and take decisive action – for the good of our troops and the security of our country.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 7 – Printed paper 21/4200 The year under review in brief During this year under review the Bundeswehr celebrated its 70th anniversary on 12 November with a pledge ceremony in front of the German Bundestag. As a parliamentary army it has guaranteed the protection of the freedom and values of the Federal Republic of Germany and its citizens since its foundation. For this we owe a debt of gratitude to all active servicewomen and men, reservists and civilian employees. With tireless commitment, courage and camaraderie, they dedicate themselves to our security and our democracy, at a time when the Bundeswehr is also faced with major challenges. The security policy situation has changed drastically – the focus of German security interests is now on national and alliance defence. At the same time Germany also remains committed to crisis regions around the world. German missions must be more specifically oriented on clearly defined European security interests and must be an integral part of the national security strategy, to efficiently address the area of tension between alliance defence and international crisis prevention. By releasing the debt brake on defence spending, the German Bundestag has set the necessary financial course for an operational and combat-ready Bundeswehr. To ensure a lasting effect it is now equally important to use the respective monies efficiently. Command structures must be streamlined for the benefit of the troops, personnel numbers must be permanently increased, national and European procurement processes must be accelerated and better coordinated, and servicewomen and men must be relieved of non-military bureaucracy. The blanket reference to “Bundeswehr underfunding” is no longer an excuse as of the year under review. Additionally, the measures required by the Federal Constitutional Court for constitution-compliant military pay, should also be implemented as quickly as possible. Personnel and its growth remain the key challenges for the Bundeswehr in further strengthening its military capabilities. Demographic trends, the competition for specialists on the labour market, the continuing high drop- out rates and structural deficits are limiting factors here. Without a consistent and sustainable personnel strategy, there is a real risk of a discrepancy between political ambitions and military reality. Particular attention should be paid to lengthy personnel processing procedures, slow-moving security checks and inadequate communication with those affected. With the introduction of the new military service in particular, the question of whether and how the armed forces’ personnel requirements can be covered is also now far more in the public eye. The targeted increase in personnel to a total of 260,000 active servicewomen and men by the mid-2030s is imperative to achieve the clearly defined and legally established target ranges on the basis of the capabilities pledged to NATO and to successfully implement Operationsplan Deutschland (Operational Plan Germany). This is the only way to create credible deterrence, so the established interim targets must therefore be achieved even earlier. The German Bundestag must swiftly and critically examine whether voluntary service is sufficient for this, based on the six-monthly reports by the Ministry of Defence, to be required from 2027. If the current voluntary service model cannot generate sufficient growth, a return to compulsory military service will be the logical next step. The Bundeswehr must already ensure now that it has sufficient instructors and the necessary infrastructure for the foreseeable increase in the number of recruits. The military registration and preinduction examination process must work. It is essential that the new military service model be accepted and not simply rejected out of hand. Clear and reliable communication is essential to ensure young people, and society in particular, see service in the armed forces as a meaningful contribution to a secure future. Existing uncertainty must be converted into trust. Voluntary military service as a special civic engagement is an important component of the new military service model. It is crucial that it be specifically further strengthened and made as attractive as possible, as it is key for the targeted personnel increases for credible national defence. The reserve service must be operationally aligned to meet national and alliance defence requirements. To achieve the targeted increase to 200,000 reservists in particular, the Bundeswehr must create incentives to stay involved with the forces after active service. The aim here above all is to recruit young people and ensure the necessary full material equipping of the reserve to active service personnel level by 2035. Bureaucratic hurdles making it difficult to apply to become a reservist must be removed immediately. Even 25 years on, after the Bundeswehr opened up all areas to women, their potential in the Bundeswehr has not been exhausted, and they still require early and targeted support. Gender stereotypes must be dismantled, and sexism has no place in the Bundeswehr.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 8 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term Bureaucracy in the armed forces must be examined to determine where it is truly necessary. This above all also means responsibilities must be streamlined and simplified, and command and information channels must be clear and understandable. It must be possible to also make decisions within the unit. The current Bundeswehr and Ministry of Defence structures are too top-heavy, too complicated and, in many areas, ineffective so consistent action is also required here. All processes, regulations and the organisational structure must be thoroughly checked for redundancies, which must be removed or at least adjusted as necessary. Digitalisation must also be accelerated with the utmost urgency. The absence of digital medical records in particular results in personnel processing errors, and considerable frustration among our servicewomen and men. A rapidly deployable, fully equipped and sustainable Bundeswehr is of the utmost importance. Gilt-edge solutions are a thing of the past, and in the spirit of the Zeitenwende (turning point), innovation, material and equipment availability, sovereignty in procurement, sufficient ammunition, functioning logistics and personal equipment, are just as crucial as major defence equipment. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have put the capabilities and importance of drones on full display. The security policy situation requires a robust and resilient Bundeswehr infrastructure, with an urgent need to accelerate the renovation of many dilapidated barracks. This both supports the armed forces’ operational readiness and makes service in them more attractive for our servicewomen and men. The federal states must make even greater use of special regulations for military infrastructure projects, which can also be achieved by reducing planning and procurement bureaucracy. Civilian-military cooperation must be expanded across the board, so that federal states and local authorities are integrated into processes in good time and there is greater acceptance of crisis prevention. It is quite clear that acts of sabotage on Bundeswehr properties will increase in the future, so they must be prepared for as quickly as possible. The legal extension of the military police’s powers of defence in this respect certainly is very welcome. Ultimately all armed forces’ facilities must be sabotage-proof without exception – hybrid threats included. As the foundation of the Bundeswehr’s values, leadership development and civic education forms the basis for camaraderie and trust in superiors, and is therefore a prerequisite for the armed forces’ operational capability. It is essential that the principles of leadership development and civic education are both respected and practised. The task of command supervision is to punish breaches of official duty consistently and without exception. This in particular applies to breaches of the free democratic basic order and violations of sexual self-determination. Anyone who does not recognise the principles of leadership development and civic education, has no place in the Bundeswehr. The military leadership is also responsible for ensuring tradition-fostering measures are implemented. Seventy years after its foundation, the Bundeswehr now of course has its own history with a wealth of points of reference. Protracted procedures weaken the educational effect of disciplinary law and our trust in superiors. The goal must be to speed up disciplinary and court proceedings, without adversely affecting existing constitutional standards. The legislators have created the conditions for this with the reform of the Military Disciplinary Code. We must now ensure the planned acceleration of procedures also actually materialises in practice. At the very least, transparent communication on the state of proceedings or even completed proceedings can significantly reduce the frustration of those affected. The compatibility of family and duty is a decisive prerequisite for personal commitment. Maintaining the flexibility of working time models in routine operations achieved in recent years and modernising them for the requirements of the turning point are important for the attractiveness of serving in the armed forces. It is recommended that all members of the Bundeswehr take an in-depth look at the cold start file. The Ministry of Defence must deliver the “Hair and Beard Decree”, which is modern, up-to-date and takes the interests of all Bundeswehr members into account, as quickly as possible, and especially in view of the new military service.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 9 – Printed paper 21/4200 1. Alliance and operations National and alliance defence remains the Bundeswehr’s core mission. In the year under review Bundeswehr service personnel were stationed in several countries on NATO’s eastern flank, where they protect our alliance partners in the Baltic region, the airspace over Poland and Romania, and the maritime infrastructure and sea routes in the Baltic Sea. Despite growing obligations in alliance defence, the Bundeswehr must ensure its contribution to international crisis management to the best of its ability. The stabilisation missions in the Balkans and the Middle East continued in the year under review. German service personnel were directly impacted by the heightened tension in the Middle East at locations in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. Following four years of Russia’s war on Ukraine in violation of international law, the Ministry of Defence has drawn specific conclusions for its own personnel, which must now be implemented. Troop commitments At the end of the year under review, as mandated by the German Bundestag, a total of 977 servicewomen and men were active on nine different deployment abroad. 287 German personnel were deployed in the Balkans as part of the KFOR mission. 36 servicewomen and men were assigned to the EUFOR Althea EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Middle East 315 members of the Bundeswehr were deployed at several sites as part of the COUNTER DAESH/CAPACITY BUILDING IRAQ mission. 211 German UNIFIL mission personnel were on duty off the Lebanese coast. The EU missions ASPIDES with 23, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI with 13, and the NATO mission, SEA GUARDIAN, with 76 personnel, complemented the Bundeswehr’s deployment in the Mediterranean. On the African continent the Bundeswehr contributed to the UNMISS and MINURSO missions with twelve and four contingent members respectively. In addition to the deployments abroad mandated by the Bundestag, a total of just under 30,000 servicewomen and men were also deployed with standby commitments, standing operational tasks and various other obligations. Of these, 1,046 personnel were stationed on NATO’s eastern flank in Lithuania, Poland and Romania. In the year under review, 2,303 servicewomen and men trained Ukrainian personnel in Germany as part of the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM UA) in support of Ukraine. Protecting the alliance on NATO’s eastern flank NATO’s military commitment on its eastern flank has increased in response both to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and to provocations in the Baltic airspace. Germany once again made a substantial contribution in this respect. Along with its permanent presence in Lithuania, the Bundeswehr also contributed to the protection of Romanian airspace as part of air policing operations, and deployed air defence systems in south-eastern Poland. The year under review saw numerous violations of the airspace of several alliance partners, with which German air force interceptors escorted Russian combat aircraft out of NATO airspace. Lithuania In Lithuania the Bundeswehr is making a visible and constantly growing contribution to protecting its allies by establishing a heavy combat brigade, which will be fully operational by 2027 with a unit strength of at least 4,800 servicewomen and men and 200 civilian employees. 45 Armoured Brigade – or the Lithuania Brigade – was commissioned on 22 May 2025 in the presence of the Federal Chancellor in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, and will consist of 122 Armoured Infantry Battalion, 203 Tank Battalion and the Multinational Battlegroup Lithuania, which was integrated in February 2026. The latter, which until February 2025 was the “enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)” and in which Germany is both the framework nation and the biggest personnel provider, has been responsible for protecting Lithuania on a rotation basis with seven countries since 2017. The brigade is growing step by step, with the Bundeswehr deploying existing army units to Lithuania and also setting up new units. Its headquarters and the first support units were already on site in the year under review, with the number of Bundeswehr personnel deployed here growing to approx. 500 by the end of 2025. To date the Bundeswehr has been able to adhere to the principle of voluntariness when selecting personnel for deployment

Printed paper 21/4200 – 10 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term in Lithuania. Whether this will also be the case in the future remains to be seen. In the past the Ministry of Defence had already informed that it would have to deviate from this where necessary. The timing of the main body’s deployment and the brigade’s full operational readiness also depend on the punctual completion of the required infrastructure in Lithuania, but our ally reports rapid progress here. Until completion of the Bundeswehr’s biggest stationing location in Lithuania, Rūdninkai, the Lithuanian government will provide properties used for official purposes, so the Bundeswehr personnel deployed up to that point will be infrastructure- ready. The deployment of the first brigade-size force abroad in the Bundeswehr’s history is a major feat in terms of personnel and equipment for our armed forces. The Ministry therefore affords the utmost priority to equipping the Lithuania Brigade. The delivery of equipment this requires is, however, exacerbating already existing shortages for the units in Germany. And nor is it only the equipment and materials that are decisive for the attractiveness of voluntary deployment in Lithuania: • During the visit by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces to Lithuania, several servicewomen and men emphasised that, in addition to financial incentives, factors such as job opportunities for spouses moving abroad, schooling for children and the availability of affordable flights to Germany, also play a key role. Early, comprehensive and reliable information from the Ministry of Defence, for both interested and already stationed service personnel, is significantly important: • There was a request to bundle information, for example with the aid of an app, to inform future unit personnel in good time about the essential framework conditions of the stationing. • One serviceman would like to see better staffing with the Bundeswehr Social Services, which provide advice and counselling. • Another requested that a deployment close to home be provided after his foreign assignment in Lithuania. Asked to comment, the Ministry of Defence correctly informed that there is no entitlement to a deployment close to home and that personnel planning over a long-term period is not possible in every case. Personnel management does, however, do its best to take personal wishes into account. The Ministry also informed the staff planned for the Lithuania Brigade’s parent headquarters about the framework conditions of the impending deployment abroad at several events, with the participation of subordinate offices. One-on-one meetings with the Bundeswehr’s Social Services have also been possible since 2018, and the Ministry of Defence has increased their capacities in Lithuania to guarantee qualified counselling and advice. The Ministry informs that setting up and expanding the structures for accompanying family members is progressing well. It is encouraging to see that the start of daycare and school operations in Vilnius with corresponding school and afternoon care in the year under review, at least for the lower forms and thus for children in particular need of care, essentially went ahead as planned. The primary school in Vilnius even opened earlier than originally planned. During his visit to the troops, however, some servicewomen and men reported to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces that the changing information situation had considerable consequences for families: • Some service personnel, for example, had originally decided to take advantage of the relocation allowance, now less favourable for them, to avoid having to rely on an expensive private school. Others would now have to accept long commutes from their home near a private school, as their costs would no longer be covered from the 2026/2027 school year at the latest. In such instances it would be helpful if the employer could be more accommodating where the situation has changed unpredictably. The service personnel deployed to the Lithuania Brigade must decide whether they and their families want to move to Lithuania, or keep their place of residence in Germany. While the relocation allowance covers all costs associated with the preparation and completion of the move, the foreign separation allowance compensates for the costs associated with maintaining two households. The decision in favour of the relocation allowance is irrevocable from the date of the deployment and has financial consequences:

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 11 – Printed paper 21/4200 • Two service personnel stated that they had initially decided to claim the relocation allowance. Five months before their deployment they changed their decision in favour of the foreign separation allowance, but the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services did not accept this. Ultimately the Ministry of Defence agreed with the petitioners, as they had not yet started their service in Lithuania, so the orders could still be corrected accordingly. • In contrast to servicewomen and men who move to Lithuania, separation allowance recipients do not receive a salary advance for rent deposits to be paid when renting accommodation in Lithuania, as several of them pointed out and complained. The Ministry of Defence informs that the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for advance payment policy, has denied the granting of such a salary advance. The Federal Foreign Office, responsible for the Directive on Foreign Separation Allowance, is however currently examining whether the problem can be resolved by amending this regulation. Although the Bundeswehr could not remedy the situation in the year under review, it is encouraging to see that it will continue working to resolve the problem. For many servicewomen and men, having to make advance payments with private funds is often a heavy burden or even impossible, especially for those in the junior ranks. During the year under review the Bundeswehr solved a problem that had been occupying the Multinational Battlegroup since 2021. It has finally completed the air conditioning installation in the Rukla accommodation units. Such a long completion time does little for the required attractiveness of a deployment abroad in Lithuania, and must be improved in the future. Poland In the year under review the NSATU (NATO Security Assistance and Training Unit for Ukraine) air missile defence task force protected the Polish airspace over the military airport in Rzeszów with some 200 service personnel and two PATRIOT air defence systems. The violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones in autumn 2025, which NATO forces also helped to combat, once again demonstrated the importance of allied vigilance. International crisis management Iraq and Jordan The Bundeswehr is now already in its tenth year of participation in the COUNTER DAESH/ CAPACITY BUILDING IRAQ stabilisation mission in Iraq and Jordan, where, together with other NATO partners, it advises Iraqi security institutions and trains their staff. Added to this are supporting tasks for our alliance partners, such as providing air transport capacities and maritime and air surveillance. The mission focusses on strengthening the Iraqi armed and security forces, and was not without danger for the German contingent members during the year under review, as the conflict between Israel and Iran intensified in the summer months. They had to seek shelter in protected areas from Iranian drones and missiles or falling debris dozens of times. The Ministry of Defence informed that German facilities were not direct targets and announced that the mission had been accomplished. • During a visit by the then Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces in April 2025, the contingent members described how they felt they had been barely recognised by the public and body politic. The respective units are also reluctant to assign personnel due to a lack of awareness of the mission, so it can be difficult to even find service personnel to be deployed here. • Several also expressed the wish to organise joint post-deployment seminars for the entire contingent in order to be able to reflect on the deployment’s experiences together. The Ministry informs that in many cases this very understandable need cannot be met due to an internal Bundeswehr regulation, which stipulates that the journey time for travelling to a post-deployment seminar should not exceed three hours. The responsible lead unit stated that it always addresses the entire contingent when planning post-deployment seminars. However, some of those involved were exempted from attending the seminar due to the long journey required.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 12 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term In some cases the Iraqi embassy does not issue necessary visas or does not provide them on time, and service personnel are not the only ones affected by this problem. A Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces visit planned for December 2025 was also not possible for this very reason. Lebanon The United Nations Security Council unanimously decided to extend the UNIFIL mandate for the last time at the end of August 2025. The mission is scheduled to end on 31 December 2026, and will then be followed by an orderly and safe withdrawal from the theatre of operations. In the year under review the German Bundestag voted to extend Germany’s contribution to the UNIFIL mission until the end of June 2026. According to the mandate, the Lebanese security forces will be empowered in the long term to perform the respective maritime and air surveillance themselves. Bundeswehr service personnel therefore participate in training the Lebanese navy. The Bundeswehr is also actively helping to ensure the civilian population has access to humanitarian aid, and the protection of its members stationed in Lebanon must be a top priority in the context of the fragile situation in the Middle East. As the crisis situation in Israel and Lebanon worsened the Bundeswehr deployed additional personnel to Jordan and Cyprus to ensure German citizens could be evacuated when and wherever necessary. With the Hamas attack on Israel, fighting between the Islamist Hezbollah movement and the Israeli armed forces also intensified, which had an impact on the security and threat situation in Lebanon. For seagoing units, the provision of shore leave is an important factor in maintaining the motivation of their crews. • A serviceman deployed on the Frigate BRANDENBURG criticised the fact that some of the crew were not allowed to leave the ship in the port of Beirut. The reason was incomplete rabies vaccination. An investigation showed that some of the service personnel had not been vaccinated in good time before their deployment began. Although the required vaccine had been reordered, it had been mistakenly delivered to another ship. The ship command’s decision to prohibit shore leave for those affected due to the lack of vaccination protection, cannot be questioned in view of the dangers of incomplete immunisation. In future, however, the Bundeswehr must ensure only fully vaccinated servicewomen and men are deployed. Kosovo The Bundeswehr’s longest deployment also continued in the year under review. Germany has been committed to NATO’s KFOR stabilisation mission in Kosovo for 26 years. • During a visit to the troops at the end of the year under review the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces exchanged views with the President, the Kosovan Armed Forces Ombudswoman and numerous members of the German contingent. His dialogue partners described the current political situation as “calm but fragile”, and said the currently quiet situation on the border with Serbia could quickly change. Operational reality differs for Bundeswehr service personnel according to where they are stationed. Those stationed at Camp Film City in the capital Pristina reported a calm security situation. A German task force company is deployed at Camp Bondsteel, where it performs policing tasks in the border area with Serbia, including, for example, patrolling activities, operating checkpoints and enforcing the law at demonstrations that can sometimes become violent. However, the servicewomen and men stationed here still require better equipment with vehicles and protective gear to be able to carry out their at times dangerous mission. The Bundeswehr should swiftly remedy this situation. They also report that insufficient clothing supplies are a problem here. • They miss having a small “swap stock” for the most important wear items, such as boots, socks and waterproof protection gear, as procurement from Germany is extremely time-consuming. The desire for a change of clothes is of course understandable. The statement requested from the Ministry of Defence had not been provided by the end of the year under review.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 13 – Printed paper 21/4200 Financial The foreign assignment allowance in accordance with the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act is a regular subject of petitions. • In the year under review petitioners once again complained that this, or a discount with it, had not been granted, even long after their return from deployment. According to the Ministry of Defence, payment was delayed for technical reasons or because, for example, the mission was only subsequently classified as a special foreign assignment – as was the case with the Gulfstream mission. Those affected have not suffered any lasting financial disadvantages, however financial compensation should be paid as soon as possible to appropriately express the employer’s appreciation for service abroad. It would also be beneficial if in future the Bundeswehr determined the financial settlement before the deployment abroad to ensure benefits due can be paid with legal certainty. The respective foreign zone level is also criticised time and again. The German Foreign Allowance Ordinance assigns foreign duty stations to one of 20 zone levels here. The specific assignment is based on statistically determined intangible expenses and tangible additional expenses for the respective period, which are incurred with deployment abroad compared to Berlin. Based on a standardised and globally uniform procedure, a contracting company evaluates numerous criteria for each duty station as part of a data survey, converts them into a euro value and compares them with the values determined for Berlin in the same period. Using these surveys the Federal Foreign Office determines the zone levels with an annual amending regulation on 1 July of each year. • Servicewomen and men stationed abroad often feel the zone level is not appropriate for the actual conditions on site, as shown in the year under review by petitions from Sigonella in Sicily, for example, where the foreign zone level has already been reduced for the second time in a row. All salary recipients are already aware in the run-up to the foreign assignment that the zone levels are subject to an annual adjustment, as the Bundeswehr expressly points this out in an information brochure given to all those affected in preparation for foreign assignments. The Ministry does not, however, provide a specific explanation of the respective duty station’s assignment to a foreign zone level. In future the servicewomen and men affected should be informed about the criteria that are decisive in adjusting the foreign zone level to ensure greater understanding. The fact that the retroactive adjustment of the foreign zone level is not possible was also criticised in the year under review: • The Bundeswehr set up a new base on the Isle of Portland in the UK in February 2025. As the corresponding regulation is always published each year on 1 July, until then there had been no individual assessment for this site. Instead, in accordance with the regulations in force at the time, the zone level was based on the administrative district of London, for which zone level 3 is specified. Portland was only assigned zone level 5 when the revised regulation was issued on 1 July 2025. The payment of the overseas allowance at zone level 5 requested by a serviceman stationed there since 1 February 2025 was therefore only possible from 1 July 2025. The Ministry of Defence nevertheless took the petition as an opportunity to obtain a legal amendment to the German Foreign Allowance Ordinance. In future recently established duty stations that are not yet listed in the ordinance can be allocated to a zone level that differs from the administrative district. The tangible and intangible expenses of the respective duty station are thus already taken into account from the beginning of the foreign assignment. Financial disadvantages, such as those seen by the petitioner, are thereby avoided. Voting in the Bundestag election The dissolution of the German Bundestag by the Federal President meant early elections would be held in March 2025. Several service personnel stationed on foreign assignments and missions contacted the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces to highlight problems exercising their right to vote. • Some weeks before the Bundestag elections, the commander of a seagoing unit expressed his concern that not all of the personnel under his command would be able to cast their votes, because the postal ballot documents would only be sent out a few days before the elections.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 14 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term • Several petitions and a special evaluation conducted by the German Armed Forces Command, United States and Canada, showed that not all servicewomen and men stationed in North America had received their ballot documents in time. This is unacceptable, but the Ministry of Defence is not responsible for it, as it has demonstrably taken various measures at great expense to enable all servicewomen and men to vote in the Bundestag elections. It made an early request to the Federal Ministry of the Interior to speed up the processing of service personnel postal ballot applications and to send out the documents without delay. Information on the procedure for postal voting for the German Bundestag and sending the “Application for entry in the voters’ register and for a polling card for Germans living abroad” was sent to the foreign offices in January 2025, after the date for the new election was announced. Several couriers were then sent to the countries of assignment to deliver the postal ballot documents to the individual foreign contingents and bring the completed ballot documents back to Germany, where they were handed over to Deutsche Post in good time before the election. The Ministry of Defence was also able to rule out any possible connection with “domestic postal addresses”, which primarily serve to ensure addressability within Germany and contractual arrangements between service personnel stationed abroad and insurance companies and banks. The Ministry of Defence rightly regrets that not all members of the Bundeswehr received their ballot documents in time, however the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces agrees with the assessment that this was due to the exceptionally tight deadlines with the early election in 2025. The Commissioner also asked the Federal Returning Officer for a statement to raise awareness in the future. The Returning Officer explained that the postal ballot documents were sent late because printing could only begin after the election nominations had been formally authorised, which was just 24 days (instead of the usual 52) before the election. The ballots were then immediately forwarded to the local authorities responsible for sending the postal ballot documents. The different printing service providers meant there were regional differences with the start times for sending out postal ballots. The Federal Returning Officer assured that, as part of the ongoing evaluations and in coordination with all agencies involved, they would carefully examine how the corresponding processes could be optimised within the respective areas of responsibility.

Alliance and operations The security policy situation has changed drastically – the focus of German security interests is now on national and alliance defence. At the same time Germany also remains committed to crisis regions around the world. German missions must be more specifically oriented on clearly defined European security interests and must be an integral part of the national security strategy to efficiently address the area of tension between alliance defence and international crisis prevention. 2. The Bundeswehr’s financial resourcing The primary defence budget (Section 14) was allocated approximately EUR 62.3 billion in the 2025 financial year, EUR 10 billion more than the previous year. Actual expenditure in 2025 ran to some EUR 59.4 billion. Industry-related delays, disruptions in project processes and favourable market price trends with real estate and buildings management had already produced shortfalls with the planned expenditure estimates in 2024. In the year under review the Bundeswehr special fund was estimated to have an expenditure volume of some EUR 24 billion, of which approximately EUR 19.5 billion was spent. At the end of 2025 approximately EUR 51.5 billion of the special fund was contractually bound beyond 2025. By the end of the year under review, together with the Defence Committee, the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag had approved a total of 103 “EUR 25- million proposals”. The total volume of these proposals ran to approximately EUR 83.8 billion. This “procurement boost” is of course very welcome. Flexible funding for commanders totalled approximately EUR 20.5 million in the year under review. The average outflow of funds per office was EUR 55,883. Altogether 4,208 procurements were initiated via these budget funds. The average procurement amount was approximately EUR 4,800. In the year under review it became clear that some information on the range of possible uses of budget funds had not yet reached the troops: • During visits to troops by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces and in their petitions, servicewomen and men once again criticised the fact that flexible funding was subject to excessively stringent regulations and applications were too frequently rejected due to budget guidelines.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 15 – Printed paper 21/4200 There were also important changes here. One result of the evaluation of the 2022 flexible funding is that, since the 2025 budget, commanders are no longer bound to one budget item for corresponding expenditure, but rather can also use other items within the same budget chapter. This is a step in the right direction towards even more flexibility with procurements. The fact that a new budget item now also enables the procurement of commercially available drones from corresponding framework contracts must in particular be emphasised here. The armed forces made intensive use of this in 2025, and allocated a good deal of the funds available to purchasing micro drones and drone accessories. The German Bundestag released the defence budget from the debt brake in the year under review to enable investment in military necessities, a decision which is very welcome, as ultimately our troops must be well equipped and sustainable. This requires increased personnel, ammunition, military equipment and investments in the military infrastructure. Less bureaucracy with procurements is required and the defence technology industry must get on board so the Bundeswehr can get the military equipment it needs. During troop visits the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces far too often saw that there was still a lack of equipment for training purposes, ranging from simple tyres for motorbikes to modern major equipment, such as the FENNEK reconnaissance vehicle. Investment is also required to strengthen alliance defence and expand homeland security. The decision taken by NATO member states in The Hague in June 2025, providing for a defence spending increase to 3.5 percent plus 1.5 percent for other defence-related GDP expenditure, is therefore very welcome. Furthermore, the ability to act in the event of casus foederis or states of tension and defence in accordance with Articles 80a and 115a of the Basic Law is also important in this respect. The introduction of a new chapter for “Bundeswehr national and alliance defence measures” in Section 14 of the 2026 budget is helpful here, as it enables simplified accounting and therefore a faster response to threats.

The Bundeswehr’s financial resourcing By releasing the debt brake for defence spending, the German Bundestag has set the necessary course for an operational and combat-ready Bundeswehr. To ensure a lasting effect it is now equally important to use the respective monies efficiently. Command structures must be streamlined for the benefit of the troops, personnel numbers must be permanently increased, national and European procurement processes must be accelerated and better coordinated, and servicewomen and men must be relieved of non-military bureaucracy. The blanket reference to “Bundeswehr underfunding” is no longer an excuse as of the year under review. 3. New military service The security policy debate in Germany in the year under review was dominated by the discussion surrounding the reintroduction of compulsory military service. Particularly controversial here was the question of the extent to which a new military service should include compulsory elements. A bill on modernising military service, initially approved by the Federal Cabinet in August 2025, was the subject of broad and necessary discussions, given the differing political viewpoints. Ultimately the German Bundestag amended key points of the draft during the respective parliamentary debates, resulting in a compromise. This required time, which is of course a scarce commodity, given the threat situation and the need to improve the Bundeswehr’s national and alliance defence capability. It has now been four years since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and the turning point it triggered. Decisions taken must therefore be implemented swiftly. The Act on the Modernisation of Military Service passed by the German Bundestag in December 2025 aims in particular to recruit more women and men from the respective temporary-career volunteers and career soldiers, and to increase the reserve service. It therefore grants the Bundeswehr access to the registration data of all men liable for military service in the relevant age groups and all those in the reserve service, thus reactivating military registration. The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management also has the option of retrieving the registration data of people who are not liable to military service and thus also of providing women with information about activities in the armed forces or informing them of the possibility of voluntarily submitting a declaration of readiness. All those contacted by the Bundeswehr also receive a reference to legally regulated voluntary service schemes. The act includes specific targets for increasing the number of personnel in the Bundeswehr over the next few years, with the goal of increasing the number of active servicewomen and men from somewhere between 186,000

Printed paper 21/4200 – 16 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term and 190,000 in 2026 to somewhere between 255,000 and 270,000 in 2035. With the available reservists the plan is to increase the total number from somewhere between 70,000 and 80,000 in 2026 to at least 200,000 in 2033. Both comply with NATO’s capability targets, which Germany has committed to. From January 2027 the Federal Ministry of Defence must report to parliament every six months on whether it is achieving the specified personnel increase. The act’s requirements are therefore sufficiently specific and, above all, verifiable, thus enabling

positive adjustments where necessary. In contrast to the original draft, the legislators have retained the voluntary military service model, but have adjusted the basic military period of service. The minimum voluntary military service period is now six months instead of seven, and the maximum period is eleven months instead of 23. The basic military pay is approximately EUR 2,600, plus a supplementary child allowance of EUR 115 per child. Commitments of twelve months or more are now completed as a temporary-career volunteer. The legislators have therefore reduced the minimum term of enlistment from two years to one. This status has a higher military pay level, and there are also other incentives, such as grants for car or HGV driving licences (up to EUR 3,500 and EUR 5,000 respectively). Despite its adherence to the principle of voluntariness, the act also includes compulsory elements. In future the Bundeswehr will use a questionnaire to request a declaration of readiness and ability to perform military service. While the information is voluntary for women, all men born on or after 1 January 2008 are obliged to respond, and must also comply with the request for a preinduction examination. The aim of the questionnaire is to establish direct contact with young people, to awaken their interest and thus to recruit sufficient new personnel for the Bundeswehr every year. A return to compulsory military service is envisaged if there are not enough volunteers or the defence policy situation requires a quicker increase in the armed forces. The German Bundestag can only substantiate needs- based compulsory military service with a separate law or act of its own, whereby the number of inductions would be based on the armed forces’ needs. If more suitable people liable to military service than the Bundeswehr requires are then available, those to be inducted could be selected per random process. The German Bundestag is also responsible for deciding whether there should be a random or lottery system. The Act on the Modernisation of Military Service is a key step towards strengthening the Bundeswehr’s personnel numbers and is a move in the right direction. Also important here is the fact that a modernised military registration system will allow the Bundeswehr to immediately see the potential of reservists and people liable to military service. It should be emphasised that, according to the act, a person cannot be called up for military service against their will, even after completing the compulsory questionnaire and preinduction examination. And nor does the Bundeswehr send volunteers abroad against their will, to Lithuania, for example. They will only be considered for a special foreign assignment if they agree to this separately and in writing, and the act does not include an automatic mechanism for the establishment (re-establishment) of compulsory military service. Nevertheless, given the security policy situation and the target of approximately 260,000 active servicewomen and men and 200,000 reservists envisaged by the Minister of Defence, there are still doubts about the prospect of success of the principle of voluntariness. The fact that parliament has defined the growth targets for the following years in the act that has now been passed, and has underpinned them with a corresponding obligation to report on target achievement, is therefore entirely welcome. The possible introduction of compulsory military service by law thus takes appropriate account of the herewith associated encroachment upon a basic right. However, if the armed forces are unlikely to achieve the act’s target numbers, parliament and the government must react immediately and introduce compulsory military service. Decisions on our country’s defensive capabilities cannot be delayed any longer. It is now imperative that we quickly create the necessary framework conditions for the new military service. Preinduction examination centres must be set up, training, accommodation and supply capacities must be built up and the required amounts of equipment, clothing etc. must be provided. In view of the security situation and the commitments made to NATO, a much faster pace is exigent to ensure our country’s overall defence in homeland security and national and alliance defence, as Russia’s war of aggression makes it abundantly clear that security cannot be simply taken for granted. People who are prepared to defend democracy and its values and who are committed to society are all the more urgently required – in the Bundeswehr, in disaster preparedness, nursing care, or with the fire service, for example. Should the introduction of compulsory military service prove necessary, the Federal Government must offer an alternative civil service for those who then exercise their right to conscientious objection. This would once again provide an opportunity to create a modern compulsory service

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 17 – Printed paper 21/4200 model, thereby promoting social cohesion in Germany and permanently expanding and strengthening the overall defence capability for the long term.

New military service The German Bundestag must swiftly and critically examine whether the Bundeswehr’s personnel targets for the new military service are being achieved on the basis of the six-monthly reports by the Ministry of Defence, which will be required from 2027. If the current voluntary service model cannot generate sufficient growth, a return to compulsory military service will be the logical next step. The Bundeswehr must already ensure now that it has sufficient instructors and the necessary infrastructure for the foreseeable increase in the number of recruits. The military registration and preinduction examination process must work. It is essential that the new military service model be accepted and not simply rejected out of hand. Clear and reliable communication is essential to ensure young people, and society in particular, see service in the armed forces as a meaningful contribution to a secure future. Existing uncertainty must be converted into trust. 4. Personnel Personnel budget developments While negotiations on the defence budget, including the personnel budget, are the Federal Ministry of Defence’s responsibility, the various services are responsible for the structural detailed planning of the respective posts. On the whole the Bundeswehr still required more established posts in the year under review. It is therefore encouraging to see that the budget legislators provided approximately 10,000 additional military established posts for 2025. This trend will continue in 2026 with a further 30,000 established posts, of which 20,000 are earmarked for the new military service, which means the Federal Ministry of Defence will have 222,483 military established posts at its disposal in 2026, an increase of 22 percent compared to 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine. Since the 2025 federal budget, the Bundeswehr has been allowed to utilise established posts across career paths in some areas to ensure greater flexibility in managing the limited number of established posts and better options to respond to the respective personnel situation. It can therefore use vacant NCO established posts for servicewomen and men in the enlisted personnel career bracket, when and if required. This flexibility is extremely important for personnel recruitment and the potential for development in the Bundeswehr, and is therefore welcomed for its attractiveness for the Bundeswehr as an employer. Given the target personnel figure of 260,000 active service personnel by the mid-2030s, this positive development must continue, especially with the personnel budget. Personnel situation At the end of the year under review the military personnel figure was 184,194 active servicewomen and men, of which 59,447 were career soldiers, 112,578 were temporary-career volunteers and 12,169 were military service volunteers. Fortunately the number of personnel in 2025 was consistently higher than that in the same months during the previous year. By the end of 2025 personnel strength had increased significantly by approximately 3,000 servicewomen and men compared to the year before (2024: 181,174). It was the strongest year for recruitment since compulsory military service was suspended in 2011. The share of servicewomen and men in the respective rank categories in the year under review was distributed as follows: 21.6 percent officers, 49.1 percent NCOs and 29.3 percent enlisted personnel. Within the Bundeswehr’s current personnel structure there is therefore almost one officer for every enlisted member. Whether the armed forces’ national and alliance defence duties can really be sustainably performed with such top-heaviness is questionable. Temporary-career volunteers make up the largest of the four status groups. These usually come from a civilian working life, and from 2026 can now commit to between 1 and 25 years, so they can return to another working life at a later date. As the majority prefer a shorter commitment period, they generally leave the Bundeswehr relatively quickly, so the steady increase in the number of temporary-career volunteers with a long service

Printed paper 21/4200 – 18 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term commitment period of 15 years or more is therefore worth noting. The number of service personnel with a fixed commitment period of 25 years alone has increased almost thirteenfold in the past decade – from 667 in mid-2015 to 8,602 in mid-2025. With entry into force of the Zeitenwende article law in the spring of the year under review, the maximum period of service in the Medical Service career bracket is now 30 years instead of the previous 25. The Bundeswehr thus aims to retain highly qualified medical personnel in the long term, without having to facilitate the status change to career soldier, as, unlike professions where reintegration after employment termination at an advanced age is often difficult or even impossible, this does not apply to doctors and staff employed in healthcare professions. Their expertise means a smooth transition from military to civilian working life can be assumed, even after an extended period of service. The Bundeswehr should also consider greater flexibility in the commitment period for suitable understaffed assignments, in order to increase their attractiveness. This in particular applies to older servicewomen and men who have re-enlisted or been recruited via lateral entry and who, after 25 years of service, are only a few years away from retirement anyway. A steady increase in the number of career soldiers in the overall military numbers was also recorded. While the figure here was still around 29 percent in 2021, it had already risen to around 32.3 percent by the end of the year under review. At 34.8 years, the average age of career soldiers and temporary-career volunteers remained the same compared to the previous year (2024: 34.8 – 2023: 34.6 – 2022; 34.2 – 2021: 33.8). The average age trend, however, only provides a very superficial picture of the actual age structure. A more differentiated analysis of the changes in each age group that influence the average is required here. Interpreting the trend should also consider the fact that deployments differ in their physical requirements and in some areas experienced and well-trained personnel have added value. Approximately 20.6 percent of the posts above the junior ranks career bracket were vacant at the end of the year under review (2024: 19.9 percent). The number is reduced to 17.3 percent when the additional personnel who perform duties outside of posts in “post-similar” positions are taken into account. Approximately 28.7 percent of the posts were not filled with enlisted personnel. Taking into account those doing voluntary military service, who are regularly deployed outside of posts in the junior ranks, this results in a purely numerical occupancy rate of approximately 96.4 percent. Personnel and application processing Many servicewomen and men and reservists again criticised fundamental shortcomings in personnel and application processing in their petitions in the year under review. This in particular applies to the time required and quality of the processing of applications, requests, complaints procedures and communication with careers and assessment centres: • One petitioner reported numerous errors in the processing of her application, which led to her being mistakenly recruited only as a military service volunteer, although she had applied as a temporary-career volunteer. • Many criticised the long time it took for the Bundeswehr to reply to applications and requests, the late delivery of documents or the inefficient data maintenance. In one case an application was even deleted by mistake, • and it took more than two years to process a complaint made to the Federal Ministry of Defence, which in turn delayed the processing of further, higher-priority cases. The Ministry also referred elsewhere to the high number of processes and the resultant need for prioritisations in the processing. The Bundeswehr’s attractiveness as an employer is directly linked to the quality of military personnel management, whereby the lengthy and sometimes incorrect processing of applications understandably causes considerable frustration, as it often involves important personal decisions that have an impact on people’s future careers and lives. The reasons for the deficits listed are a lack of staff, the high number of applications and complaints to be processed and insufficient digitalisation. Processes must be optimised here, in other words simplified and above all digitalised and automated, particularly in view of the required and expected future increase in personnel.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 19 – Printed paper 21/4200 The time required and the way complaints procedures are handled by the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management also caused considerable dissatisfaction. Servicewomen and men sometimes, for example, cannot understand the reasoning provided in the decisions made. In some cases the content of such decisions is presented in such an abbreviated form that the irritation of those affected is clearly understandable. The Ministry of Defence took an individual case here as the opportunity to instruct the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management in general terms to formulate the reasons for decisions so they are easier for those affected to understand. Personnel recruitment The importance of recruitment increased further in the year under review as a result of the discussions surrounding the new military service – and with it the existing challenges also increased. The trend is set to continue, and the number of applications and recruitments will have to increase continuously over the next ten years to achieve the clearly defined and legally established target ranges based on the capabilities pledged to NATO for the targeted personnel growth to a total of 260,000 active servicewomen and men by the mid-2030s. The strategic target of 203,000 service personnel by 2031, already pursued for some time, has therefore increased significantly. Achieving this new goal is a considerable task, and the framework conditions with which the Bundeswehr intends to generate increasing application and recruitment numbers are also challenging. Demographic trends are producing fewer potential applicants, as competition with the civilian labour market continues to intensify. Added to this are the school reforms in some federal states, where the school leaving examination is now taken after thirteen school years rather than twelve. • In the year under review this applied to Bavaria, where the change meant there was no state-wide higher education entrance qualification examination in 2025, and therefore no school leavers qualified to enter higher education could join the Bundeswehr as recruits after leaving school. Even if this is only a temporary phenomenon, it nevertheless has effects on the armed forces, and particularly at regional level. According to the study on public opinion regarding security and defence policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, published by the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences in the year under review, only eleven percent of the 16 to 29-year-olds polled could imagine working as a servicewoman or man. Interest has therefore fallen noticeably compared to the previous year, when the figure was approximately nineteen percent. The study does not provide more detailed information on the reasons for this, however two factors it identified as influencing the attractiveness of the Bundeswehr are worth noting. Generally speaking the more respondents know about the missions on NATO’s eastern flank, the more interested they are in the Bundeswehr as an employer. Interest in the military profession also increases among young men when they have a positive view of the Bundeswehr’s equipment and weaponry and its national defence capability. Public relations and information activities Before applying for active duty as a servicewoman or man or a reservist, those interested should be well informed about the possible activities and occupational fields in the armed forces. The Bundeswehr must demonstrate that it is an attractive employer. The Ministry of Defence relies on various advertising campaigns, which it communicates via numerous channels – such as nationwide with posters in public spaces, or regionally on bread bags at the local bakery, for example. The Bundeswehr also advertises at career, trade, consumer and job fairs, while camps and visitor days are designed to provide real on-site insights into various armed forces’ job profiles. The most successful activities here, according to the Ministry, were those that provided participants a look behind the scenes of various occupational fields with the services over several days. The Bundeswehr must always ensure here that it conveys a realistic and credible image of the activities and work performed in the armed forces. It is also especially important in this respect, that misconceptions about the military profession or specific assignments be avoided from the outset: • A former serviceman pointed out that the Discovery Days, an experience week with the armed forces, should illustrate more than just the attractive elements of the Bundeswehr. The challenges and hardships of service

Printed paper 21/4200 – 20 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term should also be addressed, so potential recruits know what they are getting into. The petitioner himself had left the Bundeswehr because of mistaken assumptions. The importance of the Bundeswehr presenting itself honestly and providing applicants the right information is also confirmed by a study into the reasons for dropping out of the Bundeswehr, which it has conducted on a more differentiated level since a revision in 2023. The study shows how misguided expectations quickly lead to disillusionment with the military profession, and to termination of duty. To ensure its personnel recruitment is more modern and effective, the Bundeswehr now logically posts job advertisements in online portals. In the year under review it posted a total of 1,815 such ads, and it announces vacancies on specialist portals. It is also present on digital learning and educational platforms, in particular to reach pupils and students who are not yet actively looking for a job. As it is essential that the Bundeswehr must regularly review and evaluate its advertising activities, a reporting system monitors the success of such job advertisements in online job portals for optimisation and further development. Advertising campaigns must of course be proportionate to the armed forces’ operational capability. They in particular must not interfere with the everyday duties of active servicewomen and men, which they sometimes do: • During a visit to the troops, soldiers from 104 Tank Battalion criticised the fact that a battle tank their unit urgently needed had been moved to Nuremberg at short notice as part of the “Mission 12” candidate camp, to be used for advertising purposes. As understandable as the idea of providing interested people with a real understanding of the Bundeswehr may be, the Ministry should nevertheless take more care not to deprive combat units of their equipment. The Bundeswehr’s attractiveness as an employer cannot be conveyed by advertising activities alone. The fundamental acceptance and reputation of the armed forces in society also play an essential role, which requires servicewomen and men to be visible to and recognisable by the general public. • The Bundeswehr’s “Red Storm Bravo” exercise, in which participants trained civilian-military cooperation in Hamburg in a fictitious scenario in September 2025, was not a targeted public relations or recruitment activity. Nevertheless, servicewomen and men reported visible recognition and appreciation from the people of Hamburg. • The “Bollwerk Bärlin III” exercise in November of the year under review, in which troops of the Guard Battalion trained in realistic big city conditions, including urban combat in a Berlin underground station, had a similar high public profile effect. Irrespective of all the praise and criticism these exercises drew, they demonstrate how they can strengthen the Bundeswehr’s presence and perception in society. Cooperation with the Federal Employment Agency is particularly important when it comes to personnel recruitment. The Bundeswehr reached an agreement in principle with the FEA on more effective cooperation in November 2024. One of the measures already implemented is the Bundeswehr’s targeted presence on the Agency’s premises, with career coaches present on site, for example. The Federal Employment Agency also offers its employees voluntary information events on armed forces’ matters in cooperation with the Bundeswehr, which of course is very welcome. Whether or not this purely voluntary practice reaches a sufficient number of employees should also be considered here. The positive and practical cooperation between the Bundeswehr and the Federal Employment Agency should be further expanded. It should, however, be pointed out that the digital statistical recording of people who apply for and are recruited by the Bundeswehr based on placement proposals or job recommendations from the Federal Employment Agency is only possible within limitations. Optimising the data collection possibilities to better evaluate the measures taken would appear logical here. Ultimately the satisfied servicewomen and men who recommend the Bundeswehr as an employer on their own initiative, are the best advertisement for the Bundeswehr.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 21 – Printed paper 21/4200 Applications 55,958 people applied to serve in the Bundeswehr in the year under review. The increase in applications recorded in the previous year therefore stabilised significantly (2024: 51,200 – 2023: 43,195 – 2022: 43,908 – 2021: 49,236). The increase here applies to all career brackets. 5,045 applicants withdrew their application, mostly for personal reasons or without giving any. 48 applicants said the application process had taken too long and therefore they had stopped it. The Ministry of Defence reported that the average time between application and assessment start in the year under review was approximately six weeks. The Bundeswehr is therefore now well ahead its self-imposed target of eight weeks, which on average it had just barely achieved in previous years. According to the Ministry the waiting time also depends on the applicants’ preferred dates, however the Bundeswehr shows flexibility here and can generally offer assessment appointments within a week of receiving the application, which of course is very welcome. Petitions and discussions during troop visits nevertheless once again made it clear that many still believe the length of the application process is problematic: • One serviceman described how more than a year had passed between his application in April 2024 and his recruitment in June 2025. In this case he showed perseverance and did not withdraw his application. Many others, however, do not. Far too often long processes cause applicants to look for alternatives, especially if they do not receive an interim message about their application for several months or more. In particular cases where the length of the application process is extended because applications are lost in the careers centre must be criticised here. The Bundeswehr is fully aware that time plays an essential role in the application process. One measure to accelerate the process is therefore to combine the first counselling session with the assessment, so applicants do not have to travel to the careers centre twice. Irrespective of this, the Bundeswehr is already working on reducing the waiting times between application and assessment: • A pilot project ran at the Erfurt careers centre in the year under review, in which the career coach made an appointment for the assessment process immediately after the counselling session. The services also do their best to schedule the applicants who are successful in the assessment as quickly as possible, however they can only be recruited when all the necessary documents have been submitted, which often results in delays. • The process from scheduling through to recruitment took an average of 112 days in the year under review, which is two weeks longer than the previous year (2024: 98 days). The Ministry of Defence says this considerable length of time is due to the difficulty of optimally coordinating the applicants’ wishes with the actual local time and recruitment possibilities. Another reason for the time required could be the fact that the complex scheduling process is still not very automated, so exploiting the potential of comprehensive digitalisation would of course be logical and expedient. Of the 55,958 applications received, the Bundeswehr rejected 11,590 on its own initiative. The most common reasons for rejection were insufficient cooperation in the application process, health reasons and a lack of mental or character suitability. The increase in the number of applicants the Bundeswehr classified as unsuitable in the year under review was considerable. Of the approximately 25,230 completed military medical examinations for recruitment as a temporary-career volunteer, the doctors in the careers centres classified approximately 2,090 applicants as unfit for service in the year under review. This is approximately 8.3 percent (2024: 6.3 percent; 2023: 5.5 percent). The Bundeswehr does not recruit applicants who are medically unfit for military service, and does so consistently and correctly. However, many active servicewomen and men, especially instructors, continue to say during troop visits that they believe the “quantity before quality” principle applies in the career centres, with basic training including an increasing number of service personnel who are not suitable to serve in the armed forces for health reasons. • They reported recruits who were massively overweight, had deafness in one ear, congenital high blood pressure, or torn ligaments that made running impossible.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 22 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term Needless to say many young servicewomen and men who do not have the necessary physical fitness at the time of recruitment can be trained in basic training. Recruits must, however, always meet certain health requirements when being recruited, so they can satisfy the high physical and mental demands of military service. The “fitness for on-board duty”, essential for deployment on a ship, is especially important for the Navy. • The Ministry of Defence is now recruiting more sports instructors to increase the fitness of the Navy’s servicewomen and men. It will also revise the criteria for maintaining fitness for on-board duty and the respective health indicators, so applicants who do not appear to be sufficiently healthy at the time of recruitment, are not scheduled for on-board posts. Requirements and job profiles that are too narrowly defined or are not clearly communicated can cause frustration if they result in the rejection of motivated applicants. The contradiction between expectation and reality often only becomes apparent during the selection process. The Bundeswehr only has limited requirements for certain career brackets, which is why many cannot understand the effort invested in the multi-day assessment. If they had known the chances of success were in fact low, a lot of applicants would not have started the process in the first place. Digitalisation of the application and scheduling process Digital solutions are absolutely essential in the personnel recruitment area. On one hand the Bundeswehr must cope with the targeted significant increase in application and recruitment figures, without any decrease in the quality and accuracy of the processing. The digitalisation of processes offers considerable opportunities to increase efficiency here. On the other hand, with the application process the Bundeswehr also has the opportunity to present itself to potential servicewomen and men. An impressive and modern digital presence is a key factor to be able to compete with civilian employers. Unfortunately the “Online Assessment” digitalisation project, now ongoing for almost six years, has still not been fully completed. Online diagnostics have been in the implementation phase for some years now. According to the Ministry of Defence, after adjusting the work schedule and timetable, completion is not expected until mid-2026. The fact that the “E-Recruiting” IT system has finally been certified for processing and storing highly personal data since April of the year under review, so that the digital provision and processing of application documents is possible in principle, is of course very welcome. This, however, is where digitalisation ends, as the complex scheduling process is not fully software-supported. The rapid development of a corresponding digital programme is required to efficiently illustrate and visualise scheduling options in the future, while taking the framework conditions the applicants would like to see into account. Advice and counselling in the careers centres The Bundeswehr has 15 careers centres and 99 career information offices, which are directly subordinate to the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management. Career coaches play a key role in personnel recruitment. They are the first personal contact point with the Bundeswehr for anyone interested. Their advice aims to harmonise individual capabilities and interests with the requirements and opportunities of the armed forces. Good and honest information is essential here. • The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces regularly receives petitions from servicewomen and men who complain about incorrect information provided by career coaches with the application and scheduling process, with some deciding to leave the Bundeswehr within the withdrawal period as a result. In other cases they were unable to pursue their desired career or position, even though they felt this had been promised to them during the counselling session. Visits to the troops also illustrated a similar situation. It is often impossible to clarify the precise content of the counselling later on, because the career coaches asked can no longer remember every single one due to the high number of counselling sessions, or because it is a case of one person’s word against another’s. In isolated cases the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management makes general reference in its concluding statements to the fact that the assignment note had been signed and therefore consent to the assignment had been declared. This assessment cannot be legally objected to, and the fact that the Bundeswehr also meets the training requirements often identified during enquiries is to be welcomed.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 23 – Printed paper 21/4200 It is extremely important that the expectations of those interested in the Bundeswehr be taken seriously. In individual cases it may even be better to clearly inform applicants with obviously unfeasible wishes and expectations that the Bundeswehr is not right for them, before they are recruited at great expense in terms of personnel and costs, and will soon be disappointed and leave the Bundeswehr again anyway. The continuous training of career coaches provides the basis for sustainable recruitment and assignment planning that corresponds with the ideas expressed, so that motivation rather than disillusionment prevails later on. Above all it is also about an honest presentation of the obligations that servicewomen and men face when serving in the Bundeswehr, in particular the willingness to travel throughout Germany. Sustainable recruitment The increased number of applications was also reflected in the number of new recruits. In the year under review 25,006 servicewomen and men joined the Bundeswehr (including 11,905 temporary-career volunteers) – once again significantly more than in previous years (2024: 20,286 – 2023: 18,802). To permanently maintain the necessary increase in personnel, the Bundeswehr must ensure the increased recruitments are not countered by an equally higher number of retired service personnel, declaration of commitment revocations or dismissals. A total of 21,924 servicewomen and men left the Bundeswehr in the year under review – 4,505 of them by revoking their declaration of commitment within the six-month probationary period, and 434 by being dismissed by the Bundeswehr. Despite the positive trends with applications and new recruits, unfortunately the drop-out rate has not improved. At the end of the year under review, provisionally this was 19.8% (31 December 2024: 19 percent). As the probationary period had not yet ended on 31 December 2025 for all who had signed up, the number of revocations could still increase by June 2026. In the 2024 recruitment year, for which final figures are available, 4,736 of the 20,286 of those that had begun service withdrew their declaration of commitment within the six-month probationary period. 376 were dismissed, resulting in a final 25.2 percent drop-out rate (2023: 27 percent). In addition to further professionalised personnel counselling during the period of service, the Ministry of Defence cited the regulation re-introduced into the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act in 2024 as the reason for the positive trend from 2023 to 2024. According to the regulation the termination of voluntary military service or revocation of the declaration of commitment with temporary-career volunteers is no longer possible at simply any time, but rather only with one month’s notice during the first six months after service begins. While this is basically to be welcomed, many service personnel have criticised this new regulation: • Servicewomen and men, for example, regularly complained during troop visits, that those who had declared their withdrawal, usually called in sick until the end of the notice period, and were ill at home and thus absent from the rest of their service. They indicate that the aim of the act, to allow for reconsideration of the decision with a longer period of notice, will not be achieved. Only in extremely few cases could a one-on-one meeting change the decision to leave the Bundeswehr. It is therefore important to comprehensively evaluate the effects of the legislative amendment on the drop-out rate. A working group headed up by the Armed Forces Office accepted this task and provided an initial assessment, whereby it recommends retaining the period of notice during the probationary period, due to the first trend reversal in 2024. Contrary to developments at the beginning of the year under review, however, this reversal did not continue in the second half of 2025. The fact that the Ministry of Defence sees further need for improvement and intends to continue the working group on drop-out figures, is therefore to be welcomed. Reinstatements and lateral entry Reinstatements and lateral entries are important instruments for recruiting personnel, especially in view of the current skills shortages. The Bundeswehr can benefit from valuable previous military experience, qualifications and expertise, particularly when re-employing former service personnel, who are well-versed in the structures, processes and requirements of military service, and therefore do not require a lengthy training period. Their return is often associated with high motivation and a strong identification with the armed forces, which can have a positive effect on camaraderie and commitment.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 24 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term Some 5,784 people had applied for reinstatement in the Bundeswehr by the end of 2025, which is a significant increase of approximately 30.5 percent compared to previous years (2024: 4,433 – 2023: 3,753). Unfortunately, the unwelcome trend that more applications do not result in more actual reinstatements, was also confirmed. At just 1,674 returns to service, the number here is on the same level as previous years (2024: 1,367 – 2023: 1,655). There was, however, an increase of 36.6 percent in the number of reinstatements over the age of 40 (2025: 209 – 2024: 153). With many unsuccessful applications for reinstatement, one reason for rejection is regularly met with a lack of understanding: • Petitioners do not understand why they are rejected because there are no vacancies, while at the same time the Bundeswehr informs the public that it does not have enough servicewomen and men. The reasons for rejection here are many and varied. In some cases it is not possible to identify assignment options that meet the applicant’s wishes, because, for example, the applicant is not qualified for a specific position or there are no posts available for the desired assignment location. With older applicants the requirements of the Federal Budget Code are often not met for the desired assignments. According to the Code, recruitment of over 40- year‑olds is only possible if there is an exceptional shortage of equally suitable younger applicants and the reinstatement presents a significant advantage for the Bundeswehr. As it so often does, communication plays a decisive role in the counselling sessions. Even before an application is submitted, the Bundeswehr must proactively and specifically identify only those areas of the armed forces where there is an actual need, and therefore good recruitment prospects. Filling the corresponding positions depends on numerous factors, which in particular include individual location and assignment requests. Assigning reinstated personnel here is just as complex as recruiting new personnel. The Bundeswehr offers lateral entry to those who have not taken the traditional route via initial military training, because they have specific professional qualifications that are beneficial to the armed forces, and only require military training. The number of applications for lateral entry into the Bundeswehr increased again by approximately 19 percent compared to the same period last year to 12,980 (2024: 10,932 – 2023: 9,347). The Bundeswehr recruited 599 of these applicants (2024: 534 – 2023: 667). This also shows that rising application numbers are not synonymous with a higher number in recruitments. The most common reasons for rejection, as also with reinstatements, were primarily health reasons, insufficient cooperation in the application process and a lack of demand for the qualifications presented. Special regulations apply for lateral entrants, which mean they can be recruited for specific assignments with a higher rank than is usual in the respective career bracket – provided they meet the legal requirements. If such lateral entrants are awarded certain ranks immediately after recruitment without any previous military experience, for which veteran servicewomen and men sometimes have to work several years, this can however cause dissatisfaction: • For example, in addition to career-specific requirements, the prerequisites for lateral entrants to be recruited directly as a warrant officer II, and not as a sergeant as is usually the case, include at least nine years of full- time service that corresponds to the intended assignment with regard to the speciality and level of difficulty. A regular promotion to warrant officer II, on the other hand, requires 16 years of service after appointment as a sergeant. The Ministry rightly clarifies that there is no unequal treatment here. In times when skills are scarce, lateral entry serves to encourage qualified and professionally experienced personnel to join the Bundeswehr, particularly for assignments where there are qualified personnel shortages. The shorter period of service for lateral entrants is balanced by the qualifications they have acquired in their civilian careers. Career law accepts the lack of previous military experience in this respect in order to meet personnel requirements with professionally qualified personnel. There are no grounds to question this assessment.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 25 – Printed paper 21/4200 Personnel retention Re-enlistment Re-enlisting temporary-career volunteers is an important instrument in ensuring personnel retention. In the year under review the willingness to commit to the Bundeswehr beyond the previously stipulated period of service remained at a good level similar to that in the previous year. By the end of 2025 a total of 10,128 temporary-career volunteers had extended their period of service (2024: 10,110 – 2023: 8,072). This in particular affected the enlisted personnel career brackets with a total of 7,204 re-enlistments (2024: 7,336). The average period of service extension in all career brackets remained unchanged at approximately three years. With 3,129 initial voluntary military service enlistments (2024: 2,562) and the 3,120 career advancements (2024: 2,800) up to the end of the year under review, an increasing willingness by servicewomen and men to remain in the Bundeswehr is still clearly evident. The challenging situation with established positions, however, continued to limit the options for re-enlistment in 2025. • In numerous petitions those affected expressed their lack of understanding as to why the requested period of service extension was rejected, despite the general shortage of personnel and the intensive efforts to recruit new personnel. This is understandable and makes it clear that the Bundeswehr must transparently communicate the areas in which re-enlistment is possible to the troops. The increase in established posts in the 2025 and 2026 budgets also opens up new room for manoeuvre in this respect. Difficulties also arise with a re-enlistment if replanning has already been made for the relevant posts without the previous post incumbent being aware of this. Personnel planning is sometimes performed several years in advance, especially if extensive training and training course certificates are required. The amendment to the “Gespräche in Personalangelegenheiten der militärischen Personalführung” (meetings for personnel matters relating to military personnel management) service regulation in 2024 is therefore very welcome. This expressly stipulates that, in the event of an impending personnel regeneration, the superiors in the armed forces will ensure early personnel development meetings with the previous post incumbents. They will in particular ask the servicewomen and men if they wish to extend their period of service at their post, or enquire if they can be regenerated in some other way. Transfer to career soldier status The Bundeswehr appointed a total of 3,902 service personnel as career soldiers (2024: 2,520) in the year under review. Unlike temporary-career volunteers, these servicewomen and men only leave the armed forces when they reach the respective age limit. The Bundeswehr thus pursues a clear personnel retention objective, keeps qualified personnel in the forces for the long term, affords them career prospects and, above all, prevents personnel shortages. It is therefore encouraging that the Ministry of Defence continues to exploit this potential, and has already increased the structural recruitment requirement for additional career soldiers by 30 percent for all uniformed services and joint areas beginning from the year under review. The Bundeswehr still does not allow enlisted personnel to change their status to career soldier. The Ministry refers to the typically high physical demands of enlisted posts, which older career soldiers are generally no longer able to meet. Given the persistent shortage of personnel in the enlisted posts career brackets, however, it should examine whether the change of status would indeed be beneficial in justified exceptions, especially if a particular qualification rather than physical fitness is key to an assignment, and a transfer could be offered in individual cases. In view of the foreseeable high demand for instructors with the introduction of the new military service, it would also be worth considering allowing suitable, experienced and proven enlisted personnel to change status to force commander or squad leader. Civilian initial and follow-on occupational training Civilian initial and follow-on occupational training is a key element of the professional qualification of temporary- career volunteers for their respective military assignments. At the same time it also strengthens the Bundeswehr’s

Printed paper 21/4200 – 26 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term attractiveness as an employer, as the knowledge acquired with this training facilitates the transition to civilian working life after service ends. The total number of civilian initial and follow-on occupational training participants increased in the year under review compared to the previous year. Altogether 5,891 temporary-career volunteers (2024: 5,363) took part in 477 civilian initial and follow-on occupational training activities (2024: 460). As in previous years, most of the activities were overseen by external civilian training providers, while the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management and the regional careers centres managed and supported their implementation. The criticism regularly voiced about the quality, content and organisation of the activities underscores the importance of quality-oriented selection of training providers and regular specialist supervision: • One petitioner reported from a civilian initial and follow-on occupational training course for IT systems electronics technicians that there were no digital learning materials. The Federal Ministry of Defence believes, however, the availability of traditional computer training rooms is completely sufficient for this course. Given the demands of advancing digitalisation, this seems outdated and does not meet the requirements of modern training. Civilian initial and follow-on occupational training activities commit service personnel to educational facilities for longer periods, resulting in absences from their units. It is therefore highly logical for the Bundeswehr to examine how civilian initial and follow-on occupational training must be adapted to meet the changed requirements for personnel operational readiness. The goal is to streamline the training period and increase the retention period in the forces. The approach here of reducing the civilian initial and follow-on occupational training activities depending on the respective military background or replacing them with concentrated alternative military training is a step in the right direction. Bonuses The payment of bonuses as a monetary incentive is an important instrument for recruiting and retaining personnel. The Bundeswehr can grant temporary-career volunteers an “enlistment bonus” for initial enlistment or re- enlistment. The Zeitenwende article law has extended the scope of application here: Enlistment bonuses are no longer limited to shortage areas – they now also include re-enlistments to ensure personnel operational readiness. In the year under review the budget legislators allocated approximately EUR 27.17 million for the enlistment bonuses (2024: approximately EUR 18.94 million), of which EUR 26.51 million was spent (2024: EUR 18.71 million). The enlistment bonus is not paid until the servicewomen and men are actually deployed to the post entitled to the bonus. In some careers the period until a bonus is granted may even be several years, if, for example, time- intensive training and qualification courses are required before a transfer to the corresponding post is possible. Due to this long time between bonus application and granting, a reliable statement about the effects of the statutory adjustment is not yet possible. Career coaching also has a responsibility when it comes to approving bonuses: • Inadequate or incorrect advice has a direct impact on the bonus payment if errors only become apparent when the period of service is determined, resulting in removal of the bonus guarantee. Servicewomen and men rely on the payment of promised bonuses and are in turn bound by the declaration of commitment they submit as a result of the bonus guarantee. With the decision on withdrawal of the guarantee, it is therefore not enough to reject the justified trust of those affected with regard to the not-yet-paid bonus payment. To avoid understandable frustration, the Bundeswehr should generally assume, including in cases of incorrect advice, that the trust in the bonus guarantee is worth protecting and prevents its withdrawal. Career coaches must also be comprehensively trained, particularly with regard to the flexible granting of bonuses facilitated by the legislative amendment. Higher education Officers in operational service should have an academic education and scientific skills. The Bundeswehr universities in Hamburg and Munich offer numerous study courses, which are indeed often attractive, but do not

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 27 – Printed paper 21/4200 always meet military requirements. Many servicewomen and men do not need their study qualification for their later assignment, which often causes displeasure. The current imbalance between the study programmes offered and the respective military requirements can in part be addressed by the specialist careers for officers in operational service. The goal is to increase specialist expertise via specific assignments and to better integrate this expertise into everyday military life. A specialist career can build on both knowledge provided by the study programme and on relevant previous assignments. In addition to increasing attractiveness, especially for graduates of natural science and technical study courses, this model is also designed to attract specialist personnel from outside the Bundeswehr. Specialist careers are therefore also suitable for recruiting and assigning lateral entrants. A stringent assignment concept, specific staff promotion and career advancement must therefore be ensured here. Each year students drop out of their bachelor course at the Bundeswehr’s universities for various reasons. Of the 1,045 first-year students, in the year under review a similar number to the previous year decided to drop out of their studies (2025: 180 – 2024: 181 – 2023: 246 – 2022: 233). Inadequate academic achievements, insufficient motivation and health or personal problems were frequent reasons in this respect, whereby the servicewomen and men affected here can apply for re-enlistment without a study qualification. The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management decides on this, while considering the respective need, the disciplinary superior’s opinion and the suitability and performance of the person concerned. There is no numerical upper limit for re-enlistment. 85 drop-outs, i.e. almost half, were re-enlisted in 2025 – a clearly positive trend compared to the previous year (2024: 35), when it was just under a fifth. Internal labour market The Bundeswehr’s internal labour market could be a key instrument in retaining qualified personnel for the long term. Enabling retiring servicewomen and men to find attractive subsequent employment in the civilian sector continues to be extremely important for both recruiting personnel and retaining specialists. Despite slightly more positive trends, however, the transition figures are still too low to consider this an actual internal labour market. Of the 7,368 newly recruited civilian employees in the year under review, only 343 were former servicewomen and men, which is just under 4.7 percent (2024: 4.4 percent; 2023: 3.3 percent; 2022: 3.9 percent). To date the central point of contact for the internal labour market has always tried to increase the accuracy of applications by providing advice and checking the study course completion, because: • The final qualifications acquired at Bundeswehr universities are often insufficient or do not meet the requirements advertised for civilian employment with the Bundeswehr. Frequently the only way for servicewomen and men who have studied to change to a civilian status group is via career training for the higher intermediate non-technical service. This however means that those affected must complete a further dual study programme, even though they already have a bachelor or master’s degree. The Bundeswehr must improve here. The Federal Ministry of Defence has also further intensified its organisational efforts. Measures to improve internal communication, the expansion of advice and counselling by the Vocational Advancement Service and the extension of digital support services, show minor effects here. At the same time the Ministry also examined the legal framework. An amendment to the Federal Career Ordinance proposed to the Federal Ministry of the Interior will make it easier to acquire a civil service career qualification by recognising the knowledge and skills acquired during military service. Period of service reduction Servicewomen and men repeatedly say they would like to leave the Bundeswehr earlier than planned, due, for example, to various circumstances that could not be foreseen when they enlisted. • Proof is provided here by numerous petitions concerning rejected applications for a reduction in the period of service. In such cases there is often an employment guarantee from a state or federal police force, the Federal Criminal Police Office or another state agency.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 28 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term Saxony-Anhalt even has a special programme for former servicewomen and men with the “Feldjägerfeldwebel zur Polizei des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt” project, which enables relevant senior military police NCOs to transfer to the police service, without having to take a career examination. The extent to which other federal states or other emergency services will introduce (reintroduce) their own programmes remains to be seen. If active servicewomen and men wish to reduce their period of service, to transfer to a police authority or the civil service, for example, the Bundeswehr will approve the application with a case-by-case assessment if the period of service reduction is in the interests of the armed forces. This might happen, for instance, if the applicant’s post is eliminated and structural or other aspects do not stand in the way of such a transfer. It is of course understandable that a period of service reduction must be compatible with maintaining operational readiness and must be justified based on the personnel and regeneration situation. Particularly in cases where the period of service is only reduced by a few months, however, it may also be worth considering the public interest in an assignment with the security authorities. On the whole the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management approved more than 70 percent of the applications for a period of service reduction, with the requested reduction exceeding six months in more than half of the cases – a trend which must also be monitored. The prospect of a reasonable degree of flexibility ultimately offers servicewomen and men career planning certainty and increases the Bundeswehr’s attractiveness as an employer. Postponement of retirement In addition to the various instruments for recruiting and retaining personnel, the Bundeswehr must also organise its personnel policy in a way that is sustainably and demographically aligned with regard to age limits. With retirement the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act distinguishes between the general age limit and the special age limit, which is earlier. Both, but the special age limit in particular, vary according to the respective career. The general age limit for generals, admirals, group captains and captains at sea, for example, is 65 and the special age limit is 62, whereas for regular NCOs it is 62 and 55 respectively. Retirement after reaching the special age limit was the norm over the years of personnel cutbacks, but this is no longer the case. A total of 2,108 career soldiers retired in the year under review (2024: 1,979), of which 670 had exceeded the special age limit (2024: 544). With the increase in the retirement age for servicewomen and men as part of the Act to Restructure Civil Service Law in 2009, the law stipulated that the average retirement age must be increased by 2024 by at least two years compared to 2007. The Bundeswehr already hit the target of at least 57.2 years in 2021, and the average retirement age has since only changed marginally. In the year under review it was 57.8 years. For some years now the Bundeswehr has used a dialogue-based process to decide on the retirement date, which begins five years before the special age limit is reached. It takes both the operational requirements and the interest of the person concerned in serving beyond this limit into account. If the individual retirement date is postponed for at least two years, those affected are assured there will be no further postponement against their wishes. 858 career soldiers expressed their willingness to serve beyond the special age limit in the year under review (2024: 719). The dialogue-based process and the goal of making the individual retirement date as predictable as possible are to be welcomed, and must also apply in times of structural adjustments and reorganisation. Military performance evaluation system Military performance evaluations provide a realistic assessment of the performance and capability of servicewomen and men in the respective evaluation period, and thus enable the selection of the best under the terms of Article 33(2) of the Basic Law. They are paramount in ensuring personal professional development, as they are the basis for making favourable selection and assignment decisions and determining promotion sequences. The current military performance evaluation system from 2021 is based on the formation of comparison groups, which must be structured according to rank, salary group or status level. A uniform evaluation standard with a grading scale from “A” to “G” applies within the comparison groups. The “A” to “C” grades are scaled as follows here: Five percent of all those evaluated receive an “A”, ten percent a “B” and 15 percent a “C”. To ensure fairness

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 29 – Printed paper 21/4200 in individual cases, these guide values may be exceeded by up to five percentage points. Grades “D” and “E” are provided for average or normal performance. The Ministry of Defence believes the currently applicable evaluation system has become widely established, and informs that the number of relevant complaints has decreased slightly. This welcome trend is also reflected in the number of petitions concerning performance evaluations. Nevertheless, 99 servicewomen and men contacted the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces because of their evaluations (2024: 102 – 2023: 133 – 2022: 129). Service personnel repeatedly voice the following criticism: • Along with revision of the comparison groups, there would have to be greater flexibility in the evaluation system, which is described as a “purely quota system”. It offers nothing to increase their motivation, but instead causes massive frustration. Subjective experience shows there is no prospect of promotion at certain locations. The fact that the Bundeswehr is sticking with the current evaluation system, despite the criticism, is not without reason. The Ministry of Defence and its area of responsibility, i.e. the entire area of federal administration, are bound by the strict ruling that stipulates these framework conditions. Aptly-named tactical performance evaluations, with which actual performance demonstrated is not considered in favour of other interests of the assessors, are not permitted. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces nonetheless regularly receives such allegations: • Top marks were not awarded based on performance, but rather based on age or ongoing application procedures for acceptance as a career soldier. It is almost impossible to verify the allegation of a tactical performance evaluation in practice and ultimately prove it with legal certainty. Insufficient knowledge of the evaluation system produces displeasure among both the assessors and the servicewomen and men being evaluated. It is therefore extremely important that not only are the assessors properly trained, but, to avoid disappointment, that those being evaluated are also informed in advance about the evaluation procedure. This in particular applies to the complex coordination process, which at times appears opaque for those being evaluated – especially when it comes to downgrading by the second assessor: • One petitioner claimed she had been told she would receive a “B” in the meeting to discuss the brief assessment, but had ultimately been given a “C”. At the same time others in her comparison group were later upgraded from the announced “B” to an “A”. Responsible grading by the first assessor includes not discussing grades until they have been finalised. Good first assessors award honest overall grades they can convincingly defend in the coordination process. The responsibility of the assessors is significant for the acceptance of the evaluation system. The conclusiveness of the overall grade, as decided by the Federal Administrative Court in November 2024, is important. • Evaluations had to be rescinded in the year under review if, for example, the first assessor, despite having agreed a “D” grade with the second assessor in the overall evaluation, assessed individual elements in the aptitude, capability and performance evaluation too favourably, which no longer conclusively justified a “D” in the overall grade. In practice this regularly results in individual elements being adjusted to the overall evaluation and reduced accordingly in the new performance evaluation, after the old evaluation, which contained contradictions, has been removed. The fact that the original overall grade stays the same cannot be legally contested. However, the servicewomen and men affected often do not understand that withdrawing the first performance evaluation does not automatically improve the overall evaluation. To avoid disappointment in the complaints or petition procedure, it must be emphasised that the ability to review the professional assessment of performance evaluations is extremely limited, because the first and second assessors have considerable discretionary powers here and the parties involved may also have very different points of view. When reviewing a performance evaluation, the sole focus is therefore on whether arbitrariness or irrelevant considerations have played a role or whether formal errors have occurred. If, during the petition

Printed paper 21/4200 – 30 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term processing the petitioner is already involved in appeal or court proceedings against the performance evaluation, these must always finish first due to the separation of powers. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces is also bound by their outcome. In June of the year under review the Federal Ministry of Defence adjusted the relevant performance evaluation regulations with regard to the formation of comparison groups in leadership positions in line with supreme court rulings. Those who performed a leadership function over a period of time relevant to the evaluation must be accordingly assigned to a comparison group with a leadership function, even if they were no longer assigned the corresponding duties on the evaluation date. All second assessors must now determine whether those being evaluated had a leadership position for at least six months during the evaluation period, taking evaluation contributions into account if necessary. This change is especially welcome, as it takes the previous higher-value activity into account. Plus, the Federal Ministry of Defence also assumes the evaluation process no longer poses any professional or technical difficulties for most assessors. The slow progress with digitalisation must however be criticised. An electronic system will be introduced in 2027 at the earliest, which will make it easier for the respective overall responsible people to monitor both the complex coordination process and compliance with the guideline specifications in their area of responsibility. The Ministry says the delay is due to the prioritisation of digitalisation projects in the recruiting organisation. Even if this is understandable with the current growth situation, the fact that these projects cannot be ramped up in parallel must be criticised. With regard to the decision by the Federal Administrative Court in October 2024, according to which the assessment of potential may not be used as a selection criterion for a change of status or career without a legal basis, the ministerial draft bill originally announced by the Ministry of Defence for 2025 was not available by the end of the year under review. It is of course regrettable that the assessment of potential, which scientific studies have shown to be well suited for selection procedures, currently cannot be used as a further selection criterion. Creating a legal regulation for this should therefore be a top priority. Promotions The promotion situation eased noticeably with approval of the 2025 federal budget in the late summer. For many servicewomen and men, the months prior to this were drawn out by a long wait for promotion due to the interim budget management, although they had met all public service career law requirements. Numerous petitions highlighted the associated frustration and doubts about the employer’s appreciation. • Sergeants, more than 3,100 of whom were waiting an average of one year for their promotion in the autumn of the year under review after meeting the respective requirements, merit special mention here. The number of servicewomen and men affected by the promotion backlog had already fallen to around 3,200 by September 2025 (2024: 4,006 – 2023: 4,047). With approval of the 2025 federal budget and the resulting increase of approximately 10,000 established posts, the number of servicewomen and men waiting for promotion was, however, reduced to 42 across all career brackets in the autumn of the year under review. The Bundeswehr completely cleared the promotion backlog in the A 8+Z salary group and in the officer career brackets below the A 16 salary group. The waiting situation improved further in January 2026, after sufficient established posts were provided for promotion to A 16 when the 2026 federal budget came into force. This positive trend is especially welcome. If, as is often the case, there are fewer established posts than service personnel qualified for promotion, aptly- named promotion and assignment sequences in particular are determined on the basis of the respective current performance evaluations. • In the year under review many petitioners again questioned the procedure for forming promotion sequence groups. If competitors were still classified with their grade (usually better) from the last performance evaluation in the previous status office, they felt “overtaken” and therefore unfairly treated. The Ministry of Defence responded to this problem in March 2025 and is now creating a separate promotion sequence group for service personnel who have not yet received a routine performance evaluation in the higher- grade position, which is an appropriate measure.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 31 – Printed paper 21/4200 The Ministry rightly describes the relationship between job management and promotion as complex. An explanatory presentation provided by the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management on the intranet since 2022, for example, provides a graphic preparation of the relevant processes for creating the promotion sequence groups and can thus contribute to better understanding. It should therefore be announced to all members of the Bundeswehr, and not just be easy to find for personnel-processing staff. As a requirement for admission to a promotion sequence group, servicewomen and men must complete various minimum periods of service in their current rank, depending on their career. The relevant general regulation, for example, stipulates a period of 16 years after appointment as a sergeant as a period of service requirement for promotion to warrant officer II, of which at least three years must have been completed at the rank of staff sergeant. However, the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia ruled in several decisions on 25 July 2025 that the established Federal Administrative Court ruling under civil service law on the admissibility of minimum periods of service before reaching promotion maturity is also applicable to service personnel. The troops were quickly discussing this ruling: • Initial petitions relating to the decisions of the Higher Administrative Court illustrate the prevailing uncertainty with regard to the ruling’s consequences. Based on complaints filed by several staff sergeants, the Higher Administrative Court ordered the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management to reassess the respective rejected application for promotion. The complainants were incorrectly not included in the selection decisions for promotion to warrant officer II. The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management had rejected their promotion, because they had not completed the prescribed minimum 16-year period of service since their appointment as sergeant. The court, however, made it clear that waiting periods may not be longer than necessary to create the actual basis for a performance evaluation and performance prognosis. As a rule an upper limit for such probationary periods would therefore result from the period stipulated for a routine performance evaluation. The Bundeswehr’s interest in a balanced age structure or in certain leadership qualities, which should be reflected by a minimum period of service, does not justify any interference with the merit principle. This is therefore the first time that a higher administrative court has deemed the previous regulation regarding minimum periods of service to be unlawful and confirmed a series of first-instance decisions in recent years. Further similar proceedings are pending before the Higher Administrative Courts of Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate. According to estimates by the Ministry of Defence, a reduction in the minimum periods of service would result in up to 18,000 servicewomen and men being ready for promotion in the future, although the exact number would depend heavily on the specific framing of a corresponding legal amendment. Such a development could hardly be absorbed in the short term with a further increase in established posts. There is therefore a real danger that a new, far greater, promotion backlog will develop. The Higher Administrative Court’s ruling is in line with the clearly recognisable tendency of the Federal Administrative Court to also apply the ruling on Article 33(2) of the Basic Law under civil service law without distinction to service personnel. The Federal Ministry of Defence should therefore quickly clarify how it will take account of the principle of selection of the best with promotion to the previously bundled posts in the senior NCO career path in the future, and how it will ensure an equal transition until a new regulation is implemented. Not least in view of the already high workload at the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management, following the introduction of the new military service, it is no doubt advisable to avoid unnecessary complaints and legal proceedings. A well thought-out and prudent new regulation offers the opportunity to create meaningful performance incentives, contribute to the best possible filling of posts, and thus promote operational readiness. Security clearance Security clearance is used to protect against extremists in the Bundeswehr and to prevent sabotage and espionage. Due to the years-long high workload at the Federal Office for the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (FOMCI) and the associated challenges, problems with security clearance intensified in the year under review. This long- standing maladministration is at odds with both the necessary increase in personnel and the increased security requirements. As always, every servicewoman and man, both active and reserve service personnel, must be security vetted before being appointed to a service position. This must be provided before inclusion in weapons training at the latest, and is necessary to perform a security-sensitive duty during the further period of service. The 71,629 applications

Printed paper 21/4200 – 32 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term for security checks in the year under review reflect a further significant increase in the number of cases at the FOMCI (2024: 67,976 – 2023: 62,809 – 2022: 57,595). At the same time the number of security checks performed in the year under review also increased to 80,444 (2024: 67,894 – 2023: 57,375 – 2022: 52,288). For the first time in many years, the FOMCI has therefore successfully completed significantly more procedures than new applications were received, and the work backlog was thus reduced. The high workload and in many cases excessively long processing times, have had a negative impact on both the servicewomen and men and on the Bundeswehr’s operational readiness. The lack of pre-employment screening for soldiers in the year under review, for example, resulted in approximately three percent of recruits being released from initial training. For some training units, even this small proportion produced a considerable amount of additional administrative work and frustration on all sides: • The 803 Armoured Engineer Battalion initial training round in April 2025 had 180 recruits. With 16 of them the lack of pre-employment screening for soldiers resulted in their replacement within the first four weeks. • Of the almost 700 recruits who joined 37 Armoured Infantry Brigade at the beginning of 2025, 37, or over five percent, had to be relieved from initial training because neither security clearance nor a limited preliminary result were available in time. This often leads to a period of inactivity while waiting in the parent unit and a lack of prospects until leaving the Bundeswehr. At the same time training capacities are tied up and are not available for the recruitment of further applicants. Even in security-relevant areas such as defensive cyber activities or special units, lengthy vetting procedures exacerbate the shortage of personnel. For the servicewomen and men affected, these delays sometimes have serious legal career structure disadvantages and make career planning, preparations for relocations or foreign assignments more difficult. • One petitioner criticised the long time required for his security clearance, which prevents him from attending post-relevant training courses. For reasons that can no longer be clarified, his case was unprocessed at the FOMCI for eleven months. This delayed both his training and his ability to apply for service as a career soldier by at least a year. By the end of the year under review the extended security clearance introduced in June 2023 had still not been completed. While the FOMCI was able to reduce the average processing time for security checks (without security-relevant findings) for individual types of checks, such as extended security checks with background investigations, for example, in the year under review the average processing times for particularly frequently required security checks, such as pre-employment screening for soldiers, are higher than the previous year. • This took three weeks longer than in 2024 with both the standard and the extended security clearance, with an average duration of nine and eleven weeks respectively. There is no doubt that security-relevant findings must be duly identified and analysed in accordance with security requirements, however the Bundeswehr cannot afford to lose motivated and operationally ready servicewomen and men because of overlong bureaucratic procedures. One of the main reasons for the long procedure times is the personnel situation at the FOMCI, which has barely changed compared to 2024 and remains unsatisfactory with only 76 percent of the posts in the department responsible for security clearance being filled. The increase in established posts in the Federal Ministry of Defence’s area of responsibility from 2026 will at least make it possible to fill further posts here. Nevertheless, recruiting employees for these positions remains challenging. Delays are also caused by inadequate communication between the FOMCI and the public prosecutor’s office and other authorities involved. Consequently, time and again enquiries from the FOMCI remain unanswered for long periods and files are not sent or cannot be found because of a file number change. The FOMCI is not responsible for this, however it should take delays as an opportunity to agree standards and more efficient cooperation procedures with the respective other authorities. • During a petitioner’s security clearance, it only emerged after several months, following a request for criminal files from two different public prosecutor’s offices, that two files had been wrongly kept there because of two people’s coincidentally identical names. The files were only available more than six months after the request, while their evaluation resulted in a decision just three weeks later.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 33 – Printed paper 21/4200 The Federal Ministry of Defence has been aware of the problem of long procedure times for quite a while now. Various recommendations for action are currently being implemented based on the 2024 report by the office responsible for accelerating the security clearance procedure. The focus of the targeted acceleration is to firstly reduce any security clearance procedures that have been open for some time. Long file retention times mean certain personal data that must always be kept up to date, for example the extract from the Federal Central Criminal Register, must be repeatedly requested from other security authorities. Another objective is to regulate the introduction of new procedures, where the Bundeswehr would revise the set of criteria to classify posts with security-sensitive activities. Contrary to the Ministry of Defence’s original plans, the digitalisation of the security clearance procedure, which was also earmarked as a recommendation for action, was still a work in progress in the year under review, which is regrettable, as an appropriate IT architecture and IT capability could significantly contribute to reducing workloads and automating the entire process. Reducing manual data transfers or replacing outdated computers will of course also help here. The Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetzes und zur Änderung beamtenrechtlicher Vorschriften (Act to Modernise the Law on Security Screening and to Amend Civil Service Regulations), which came into force in January 2026, makes an important contribution in this respect. It facilitates the legal possibility of efficient, electronic and media discontinuity-free security file management, among other things by removing the ban on automated personal data comparisons. Further key elements of the act include the introduction of a general duty of disclosure, for example for contacts with foreign intelligence services or for pending criminal proceedings, and the extension of Internet searches, including social networks, to all vetting levels and all persons affected or involved. The Artikelgesetz zur Stärkung der Militärischen Sicherheit in der Bundeswehr (Article Law on Strengthening Military Security in the Bundeswehr) will replace the previous pre-employment screening for soldiers from July 2026 with a supported loyalty to the constitution check before the service status begins. The Military Counterintelligence Service will support the office entrusted with the recruitment process here, such as a careers centre, in checking loyalty to the constitution, without being bound by the processes of the Security Clearance Check Act. The Ministry hopes this will streamline the procedure, concentrate on proven test criteria and speed it up with largely automated processing. This adjustment provides optimism for the required acceleration to increase personnel numbers. Despite the planned procedure adjustments, the FOMCI’s work backlog for ongoing security checks remains high. Good communication channels with the servicewomen and men affected must therefore be established. If a security clearance is likely to take a long time or have a negative outcome, this should be informed transparently and as early as possible. On one hand this can prevent both frustration shortly after joining the Bundeswehr and a foreseeable additional burden in the initial training company. On the other hand it also provides customised advice on further assignment planning for servicewomen and men who are already serving. Personnel Personnel and its build-up remain the key challenges for the Bundeswehr to develop the required capabilities. With the introduction of the new military service in particular, the question of whether and how the armed forces’ personnel requirements can be covered is also now far more in the public eye. The targeted increase in personnel to a total of 260,000 active servicewomen and men by the mid-2030s is imperative to achieve the clearly defined and legally established target ranges on the basis of the capabilities pledged to NATO and to successfully implement Operationsplan Deutschland (Operational Plan Germany). This is the only way to create credible deterrence, so the established interim targets must therefore be achieved even earlier. Demographic trends, the competition for skilled workers on the labour market, the continuing high drop-out rates and structural deficits continue to be the greatest challenges here. Without a consistent and sustainable personnel strategy, there is a real risk of a discrepancy between political ambitions and military reality. 5. Voluntary military service Since the suspension of compulsory military service in 2011, voluntary military service has played a key role in the recruitment of Bundeswehr personnel. During their period of service, temporary-career volunteers can have a look behind the scenes in the Bundeswehr and learn about the various career opportunities the Bundeswehr offers – both military and civilian. With adoption of the Wehrdienst-Modernisierungsgesetz (Act on the Modernisation

Printed paper 21/4200 – 34 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term of Military Service), parliament adjusted the period of voluntary military service and set it at six to eleven months. The goal here is, as it was, to recruit temporary-career volunteers from among those doing voluntary military service. The good news is that this was achieved in 3,129 cases in the year under review (2024: 2,562 – 2023: 2,164). At the end of 2025 a total of 12,169 women and men were doing voluntary service in the Bundeswehr (2024: 10,119 – 2023: 9,642). Of these, 11,905 began their service in the year under review (2024: 9,156 – 2023: 8,801), which is an increase of approximately 30 percent compared to the previous year and is very positive. Within the six-month probationary period, however, 2,252 servicewomen and men ended their service in the armed forces prematurely, 1,919 left at their own request, primarily for personal reasons, and 333 were dismissed by the Bundeswehr, mainly due to a lack of physical or character suitability. This is a drop-out rate of approximately 19 percent, which is at least lower than the previous year (2024: approximately 24 percent). The absence of an option to terminate voluntary military service prematurely after the six-month probationary period, to begin some other training, is repeatedly criticised harshly: • Many petitioners said they had been told in the Bundeswehr’s career centres, or even by superiors, that they could leave the Bundeswehr at any time, even after their probationary period was over. The statutory regulations do not provide for a reduction in the commitment period. Early discharge is only possible if remaining in the Bundeswehr would mean particular hardship due to personal, especially domestic, professional or economic reasons and the discharge has been requested. According to the Ministry of Defence, the prospect of a training or study place generally does not mean there will be any particular hardship. The Bundeswehr does, however, regularly discharge people performing voluntary military service prematurely at their request if they only have a maximum of three months of service remaining until the end of their specified period of service and have proof of a subsequent job or a training or study place. Such a flexible approach is very welcome. On one hand, the Bundeswehr fulfils its duty of care by giving those doing voluntary military service who do not wish to be taken on as temporary-career volunteers the opportunity to begin a civilian training programme or study place. On the other hand, there is sufficient lead time to fill the posts that become prematurely vacant. The expectations for voluntary military service in home defence, including an increase in the reserve service, have not been met. Once again there were not enough interested people in the year under review. The figures illustrate the continuous downward trend with recruitment: While 634 volunteers began their service in 2024 (2023: 786), by the end of June 2025 the number had fallen to 255. The Bundeswehr therefore correctly ended this military service model as a standalone project in June 2025. Voluntary military service Voluntary military service as a special civic commitment is an important component of the concept of the “new military service”. It is crucial that it be specifically further strengthened and made as attractive as possible, as it is key for the targeted personnel increases for credible national defence. 6. Reserves The Bundeswehr reserve service is a pillar of national and alliance defence and international crisis management that must be strengthened. In the year under review, a total of 21,291 (2024: 20,074 – 2023: 19,084) reservists, designated and not designated for assignment, supported the active troops, including with their civilian qualifications and experience, in 50,245 (2024: 47,264 – 2023: 45,194) posts, the duration of which ranged from one day up to twelve months. This included 1,881 women (2024: 1,682 – 2023: 1,436). 60,192 reservists were called up in the year under review (2024: 49,244 – 2023: 43,065). 5,314 of these were women (2024: 4,170 – 2023: 3,246). Compared to previous years, the number of reservists called up has therefore increased once again, partly due to introduction of the reserve assignment for retiring service personnel in October 2021. By the end of the year under review, the Bundeswehr had reserve assigned a total of 28,695 women and men, which is clearly too low given the Bundeswehr’s capability targets of 200,000 reservists by 2035, among other factors, as pledged by the German government to NATO. An increase in the number of reserve service personnel will on one hand be achieved with the new military service. On the other hand, the new directive for reservist work, which is expected to come into force in the first quarter of 2026 and defines priorities, goals, targets and responsibilities in reservist work, will develop the reserve assignment for retiring service personnel into a standard reserve assignment. Instead of the current six-year reserve

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 35 – Printed paper 21/4200 assignment for retiring service personnel, the new reserve assignment will then last until the end of service supervision (at the latest until the age of 65), which is likely to result in a further increase in the total number of people reserve assigned. This measure is extremely beneficial, as it allows the Bundeswehr to retain the qualifications and skills of reservists for much longer. A further goal is to ensure reserve assignments are only made for posts in the reinforcement reserve. These are add-on posts in the active forces, used for specific growth in the event of states of tension and defence. According to the Bundeswehr’s current capability profile, approximately 90,000 reservists are required to also ensure the required operational readiness. This includes 60,000 troops in the reinforcement reserve. Added to this are 30,000 troops in the reserve pool, where reservists deputise for active servicewomen and men at what are known as “mirror duty stations” during absence and deployment periods. At the end of the year under review, however, only 23,655 women and men were assigned to the reinforcement reserve, compared to 36,356 in the reserve pool. 181 reserve assigned reservists were not assigned to either of these categories. The Bundeswehr therefore has not achieved the stated capability target. According to the Ministry of Defence, the process of building up corresponding structures in the reinforcement reserve is indeed ongoing, but a U-turn in the reserve assignment practice is not yet discernible. One reason for this, for example, is the reorganisation of the Bundeswehr, with the result that the corresponding structures in the target organisation have not yet been fully installed. The Ministry also believes it would make sense to only adjust the personnel structure for reservists once a new capability profile is available. Nevertheless, it should now emphatically create the conditions for reserve assignments in the reinforcement reserve. Well-trained reservists are of fundamental importance for the Federal Republic of Germany’s defence preparedness. Given the immense interest shown by citizens in contributing to this, the Bundeswehr must quickly reorganise its range of training courses for the target group, so reservists can better complete the training necessary for their career bracket: • Reservists criticised the fact that the current system puts them at a disadvantage compared to active service personnel and called for greater modularisation of the courses on offer. The Federal Ministry of Defence explained that all training courses are basically open for reservists with up to two places each. With the content and quantity, however, the programmes are primarily oriented on the required military needs, which are typically the highest for active personnel and are therefore the benchmark for the training on offer at the respective training facilities. Nevertheless, the Ministry has recognised that modularisation and flexibilisation of the training courses on offer are important building blocks in meeting the armed forces’ need for qualified reservists. The Bundeswehr’s centre of expertise for reservist affairs in the Armed Forces Office has therefore been tasked with redesigning the framework conditions for training reservists in all organisational components. It is therefore revising the corresponding general regulation to better take the limited availability of reservists due to private and professional matters into account. Finalisation is scheduled for Q1 2026. The goal, quite rightly, is to make the training courses more modular and technology-based for the medium and long term. This is essential, as a flexible range of training on offer increases the attractiveness of reservist service and thus the second career advertised by the Bundeswehr, along with the civilian profession. Irrespective of this, in the future the Bundeswehr should offer its own training programme for the reservist service, which could be less extensive and therefore shorter than that for active troops. It is important that reservists receive a basic training structure to be able to build on this with reservist services. It is equally important that problems that arise in the processing of personnel matters, such as lengthy procedure times or poor communication, be resolved quickly. The amendments to the Military Career Regulation, which allow reserve officer cadets with the status of temporary-career volunteer to be promoted to senior ensign again after 30 months, are to be welcomed. The frustration of some reserve officer cadets outside of military service about the completion of 24 additional reserve duty training days linked with this is generally understandable. The new regulation, however, facilitates the equal treatment of reserve officer cadets and aspirants in the line service career bracket. The visibility of the reserves’ potential leaders in the armed forces would also be increased and a professionalisation of the reserves would be enabled. The amended Military Career Regulation also offers the possibility of obliging reserve officer cadets with pre-service periods for a three-year training period in the service status of a temporary-career volunteer. The Bundeswehr still does not see any need to amend the provisions of the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act, according to which the maximum age limit is 65 for all status groups, without exception.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 36 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term • Once again in the year under review, many experienced and motivated reservists in good health approached the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, as they wanted to serve beyond the age of 65. With its reserve strategy, to be updated by April 2026, the Bundeswehr focuses on the reinforcement reserve, which requires a majority of younger people due to the requirements of home defence and the focus on national and alliance defence. However, every single person is needed, especially in view of the 200,000 reservists that the Bundeswehr has pledged to NATO. It is therefore high time for the legislators to make the outdated inflexible age limit of 65 more flexible. In Sweden, for example, compulsory military service applies until the age of 70. Civilian employees working in the reserves also regularly contact the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces: • Civilian personnel in the Bundeswehr in particular criticised the fact that they were no longer being reserve assigned and that existing reserve assignments were being removed in places. According to statements by the Ministry of Defence, these were reserve assignments of people whose civilian duties would also demonstrably have to be performed in a state of tension or defence. In all other cases the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management refrained from cancelling reserve assignments. In this context, the Ministry has also decided that Bundeswehr civilian personnel can generally also be reserve assigned to the reserve pool, until the duties and assignments in a state of tension or defence have been conclusively determined. Short- term military service in a military assignment would continue to be permitted, whereas longer-term military service to temporarily improve personnel operational readiness would typically be excluded. Bundeswehr civilian employees may only be reserve assigned to the reinforcement reserve if the person concerned is demonstrably dispensable for the performance of civilian duties in a state of tension or defence. This is understandable, as civilian personnel are also essential for the Bundeswehr’s operational readiness in a national and alliance defence scenario. The decisive factor here is that a person cannot serve their employer in two statuses at the same time. The same applies to civilian personnel of other authorities and organisations who also perform corresponding duties at state and federal level, in particular members of the emergency services. Home defence forces The home defence forces are a key component of Operational Plan Germany and are essential for national and alliance defence. They protect military facilities and infrastructure such as ports and railway systems with states of tension and defence or in the event of a crisis situation. They also secure staging and transfer points for troop transports of allied forces in Germany’s role as a NATO operational base and hub. In peacetime, the home defence forces can be deployed as part of administrative assistance, in the event of serious accidents or natural disasters, for example. In spring 2025, the Bundeswehr pooled the home defence forces, six home defence regiments and approximately 60 home defence companies, into a separate division and placed it under the control of the Army to enable uniform command, training and deployment planning. This organisational measure is extremely welcome, as it serves to positively dovetail the reserve personnel and active service personnel. The transfer of command also affected the training of those without prior service, which a total of 1,480 women and men have completed since its introduction in 2018. With a training offer of 500 places in the year under review (2024: 895 – 2023: 493) the Ministry of Defence retained its commitment to this training due to the media interest and the considerable advertising potential. Interested people and those without prior service should also have the opportunity to do military training in the Bundeswehr reserve at no great effort, so they can ideally be assigned in the protection and security forces and in the home defence forces. The target qualification (guard and security soldier), however, was not achieved in all cases due to inadequate training in some areas. The Ministry has therefore re-evaluated the training modules and has the training centrally controlled in the Armed Forces Office. At the same time, there are concerns that, of the many thousands of interested people, only a fraction submit an application. And of these not all are available for military service, meaning the training places on offer (1,000 planned in 2026) have never been fully utilised in the past. The fact that the training of people without prior service will continue is also welcome. Many women and men would like to support the reserve close to home, thus the Bundeswehr should increase its efforts to encourage them to apply. It is essential, however, that those that complete this training are enabled to actually be assigned to the reserve in the future, otherwise the associated training expense for the Bundeswehr is a waste of already scarce human and material resources.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 37 – Printed paper 21/4200 • Some of those affected criticised the fact that after the age of 60 they are no longer admitted to training for people with no prior service. At the end of the year under review, the Ministry of Defence initially introduced a maximum age limit of 57 years for training this cohort. The individual regional territorial commands had made different approval decisions on this in the past. The decisive criterion in determining the uniform age limit was operational capability. Logically or realistically, for example, junior rank service personnel who have already reached the age of 60 cannot be called up where a situation has deteriorated. Furthermore, the still limited training capacities must also be utilised as efficiently as possible. The decision taken is therefore understandable. Assurance of livelihood and other benefits An amendment to the Benefit Payment and Dependents Maintenance Act, which the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces had suggested several times in recent years, is of course extremely welcome. Since 2026, the legislators have provided for reservists who commute daily between their home and duty station to be reimbursed for travel expenses from the 30th kilometre onwards at a rate of EUR 0.20 per kilometre, limited to a maximum of EUR 20 per day of service. Former career soldiers who continue in the reserve service after their active service in the Bundeswehr, see themselves at a disadvantage with the limit on additional earnings in accordance with the Benefit Payment and Dependents Maintenance Act: • They criticised the fact that the limits on additional earnings in the Military Pensions Act, which were largely abolished by the Zeitenwende article law, had not been transferred to the granting of the minimum benefit in accordance with the Benefit Payment and Dependents Maintenance Act to former career soldiers. Former career soldiers who work in the private sector after their time in the Bundeswehr do not suffer this disadvantage, as their earnings are not offset against their pensions and related benefits. According to the Bundeswehr, the considerations based on the Zeitenwende article law are not transferable to pension benefit recipients serving as reservists for systematic and legal policy reasons. In addition to their pension, reservists currently receive a rank-related bonus (approximately EUR 700 per month), supplements similar to those received by active service personnel and tax-free benefits for pension benefit recipients in accordance with the Benefit Payment and Dependents Maintenance Act. Based on their pension, this puts them in the same position as if they were reactivated. Granting an additional unreduced pension that is not offset against the minimum benefit would not be compatible with the aim of the Benefit Payment and Dependents Maintenance Act. The benefits provided by the Act will enable reservists to maintain a standard of living in line with their previous economic circumstances for the period of service they serve for without their previous income. At the end of the year under review, the legislators amended the Benefit Payment and Dependents Maintenance Act with the Act on the Modernisation of Military Service so that, in future, the pensions of civil servants, a status group comparable to that of former career soldiers, will also be offset against benefits in accordance with the Benefit Payment and Dependents Maintenance Act. Parliament therefore did not see any need for an amendment in the petitioners’ favour here, but rather confirmed the legal situation by including a further group of people. Even if this does not take the aspect of increasing the attractiveness of reserve duty for pension benefit recipients into account, especially in understaffed assignments, the Bundeswehr’s opinion is nevertheless generally understandable.

Reserves The reserve service must be operationally aligned to meet national and alliance defence requirements. To achieve the targeted increase to 200,000 reservists in particular, the Bundeswehr must create incentives to stay involved with the forces after active service. The aim here above all is to recruit young people and ensure the necessary full material equipping of the reserve to active service personnel level announced by the Minister of Defence by 2035. Bureaucratic hurdles making it difficult to apply to become a reservist must be removed immediately.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 38 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term 7. Women in the armed forces Despite all efforts to specifically recruit women, the proportion of servicewomen rose only minimally to 13.71 percent in the year under review (2024: 13.62 percent) and therefore, outside of the Medical Service, fell far short of the 20 percent required by the Act on Equal Opportunities for Female and Male Military Personnel of the Bundeswehr. The 50 percent target in the Medical Service has still not been reached either. The number of women who applied to serve in the armed forces remained stable at approximately 8,200, however in relation to the overall increase in applications for military service, the proportion of female applicants fell from 16 percent in 2024 to 15 percent in the year under review, which will not increase the percentage of women in the combat force. This is now ten percent (2024: 9.89 percent), while the figure with career soldiers outside of the Medical Service is only approximately seven percent (2024: approximately six percent). In the Bundeswehr as a whole, the percentage of women among career soldiers was 9.9 percent (2024: 9.35 percent). The Ministry of Defence recognises that the Bundeswehr absolutely needs more servicewomen. Therefore, beyond considerations for compulsory military service for women, special efforts are required to recruit more interested women suitable for the Bundeswehr and to retain them in its ranks. It is thus important to make women in the Bundeswehr more visible, and to demonstrate that they do of course have career opportunities in it. The Ministry of Defence has made the promotion of women a priority task. It therefore emphasizes female role models, and not just in career coaching, even though servicewomen in the leadership ranks in particular are making positive headlines. • The naming of the first facility after a female soldier who fought in the Prussian army, the “Unteroffizier- Friederike-Krüger-Kaserne” barracks in Munster, also had a signalling effect. This is not token politics, but rather it shows that women have earned their place in the Bundeswehr, including the combat units – as they have in all other modern armed forces. Efforts to increase the number of women in combat units will, however, only be successful in the long term if the Bundeswehr resolutely opposes any form of gender-based discrimination, because servicewomen in particular are still complaining about sexist behaviour and discriminatory remarks in everyday service life. The “Discrimination and violence in the Bundeswehr” point of contact in the Ministry of Defence is available to servicewomen and men for such cases. The command authorities in all organisational areas must ensure that discriminatory and misogynistic incidents are not tolerated in the units, and taking decisive action against them, including beyond disciplinary action, must be an integral part of the leadership culture. This in particular applies in training facilities, where respectful behaviour and a tone based on the principles of leadership development and civic education are a prerequisite for the camaraderie and the trust in one’s comrades required in an emergency. Sexist and derogatory statements have no place in a Bundeswehr that has had women in the ranks of its combat units for 25 years. It is therefore welcome and logical that the planned follow-up study to the “Bunt in der Bundeswehr?!” (Colourful in the Bundeswehr?!) study, first published six years ago, will also take a closer look at the discrimination experienced by servicewomen and at measures to counter stereotypes. Plus, the framework conditions must also be right for women to choose the Bundeswehr over the many other possible alternatives. Infrastructure issues such as the number of toilets or the design of shower rooms can also include aspects relevant to gender equality. Where the structures are oriented towards men, unequal treatment or a lack of precautions, functioning locks on accommodation doors or separate toilets close enough to a servicewoman’s room, for example, are not always immediately apparent, but can be the reason why women do not feel comfortable. The appropriate outfitting and equipment for servicewomen is an ongoing issue – even in small dimensions or with an individually adjustable fit. The clothing for pregnant servicewomen remains unsatisfactory: • A survey in 1 Armoured Division revealed that, at 8 out of 14 locations, it still took an average of 21 days or longer for maternity clothing to be issued and tried on. The ordering process is also time-consuming and error-prone, as the maternity clothing sizes differ from the usual Bundeswehr sizes, with pregnant servicewomen having to resort, time and again, to civilian clothing. To speed up the process, a military equal opportunity officer therefore recommended having sample sets available to try on at all issuing points and with the different size charts on display. There must also be flexible options to make family, private life and work more compatible with attractive working models. A 2025 public opinion poll conducted by the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Sciences

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 39 – Printed paper 21/4200 clearly shows that women in the relevant age group of 16 to 29 rate both equality and compatibility of family and service in the Bundeswehr much more negatively than men of the same age. At the same time, following years of stagnation, the study shows an increased interest among young women in the Bundeswehr as an employer, although so far it tends to be as a civilian employee. This should be an incentive for all involved to continue working on these issues. Employer attractiveness also includes personnel management with military couples that focuses on the advancement of both partners, considers the difficulties of single parents, and bears career development prospects for later in life in mind. The recognition of training courses and the continuation of childcare facilities for school children during school holidays at Bundeswehr locations also fall into this category. Finally, it must not be ignored that, in everyday service life, setbacks with the compatibility of family and duty, presumedly with reference to national and alliance defence, impact on women in particular, as in social reality they are still regularly expected to do family and care work. The appointment of the highest-ranking servicewoman in the Bundeswehr as its first Deputy Chief of Defence sent a visible signal on the continuing issue of advancing and promoting women in leadership positions. Nevertheless, the Bundeswehr must continue to prove that it is serious about equal opportunities at the top, outside of the Medical Service. Even in the Medical Service, the goal of adequate participation in leadership positions has not yet been achieved. Women must therefore be promoted early and specifically, so they are available at all levels and can move up where necessary. Neither the Federal Ministry of Defence nor the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management saw any cause for concern in the year under review. In the third Radar report on the advancement of female officers in the armed forces, they did not find any anomalies that would indicate systematic discrimination of female officers compared to male officers. Contrary to that assumed in the first report, disadvantages could not (no longer) be seen with the personnel development projections. Due, however, to the still relatively small number of servicewomen in operational service who are eligible for consideration for top positions as part of assignment planning, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces believes this does not provide enough information and requires further monitoring. It is therefore understandable that the Radar report calls for a future examination of whether systemic barriers exist, as women in the Bundeswehr are not equally represented in all careers and fields of competence. The third Radar report concludes, however, that servicewomen are still significantly under-represented with participation in high-level training programmes, such as the National General/Admiral Staff Officer course, and with high-ranking command positions. The proportion of women in deputy branch head posts in the Ministry of Defence has stagnated at four percent. There appears to be another bottleneck in the selection procedures for commander posts. From 2024 to 2027, there were only 3servicewomen among the 243 candidates selected for this position. According to the current Radar report, only five servicewomen have ever been appointed as commanders. The Ministry of Defence is therefore paying particular attention to the preparatory work for selecting commanders from 2028 onwards. In this context, directly addressing women and men suitable for leadership and top-rank assignments in order to proactively recruit them as career officers is to be welcomed. The planned consideration of the findings of the Radar reports with the development of the new military equal opportunities plan to remove existing hurdles appears to make sense, because: • Time and again, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces receives petitions from highly qualified servicewomen who feel disadvantaged on their way to the top, or do not receive enough support from their superiors. Even in the Medical Service, where statistically almost every second leadership position must be held by a servicewoman, only a few are promoted to Medical Corps colonel or Medical Corps brigadier general. It is rarely possible, of course, to prove direct discrimination in individual cases, with performance evaluations or staffing procedures, for example; the margins of appreciation are too great, the selection decisions too difficult to review and the arguments for decisions made are too varied. In the year under review, there were still some uncertainties on action with regard to the rights in accordance with the revised Act on Equal Opportunities for Female and Male Military Personnel of the Bundeswehr, particularly in terms of the responsibilities, scope and timing of the involvement of the military equal opportunity officers. This might be, among other things, because it was still not possible to publish the implementation provisions in the year under review, which is why the military equal opportunity officers’ networking is still of key importance.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 40 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term The law already makes it clear that the equal opportunity officers have a right of participation with measures by the respective sub-office, which affect their very wide-ranging task area. This must not be undermined by the sub- office management with internal guidelines or practices. • Military equal opportunity officers, for example, increasingly reported that superiors had denied requests for telework and instead resorted to mobile working without the involvement of the equal opportunity officer. According to the Ministry of Defence, the equal opportunity officers should also be involved with construction and infrastructure projects, in order to be able to point out equality-relevant aspects early on, because, according to reports by equal opportunity officers, some of those responsible have not yet classified these matters as being “obliged to cooperate”. Furthermore, access to necessary documents and information is also extremely important, which is why sub-office managers should support their equal opportunity officers in quickly obtaining security clearances or renewing them in good time.

Women in the armed forces Even 25 years on, after the Bundeswehr opened up all areas to women, their full potential in the Bundeswehr has not been tapped. Servicewomen must be promoted early and specifically so that they are available at all levels and can also move up into leadership positions. Gender stereotypes must be dismantled. The attractiveness of the service must be increased with suitable working time models. And sexism, of course, has no place in the Bundeswehr. 8. Materiel Clothing and personal equipment Providing personal clothing for servicewomen and men has certainly improved in recent years thanks to the political will as well as the efforts of the industry and the Bundeswehr areas involved in this process. Where service personnel once complained about a lack of equipment, today they are concerned about the lack of storage options for the flood of new personal equipment. One measure to solve this problem is the procurement of lockable under-bed drawers. Support is also provided here by the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services, which is pushing the Institute for Federal Real Estate to provide suitable storage space in urgent cases. As planned, the armed forces largely managed to provide our servicewomen and men all items of the advanced full resourcing (Armed Forces combat clothing kit, MOBAST protection and carrying system, Armed Forces combat helmet and 110-litre rucksack system) by the end of 2025. All items are available or ready for collection in almost all cases and are well received by the troops. • Unfortunately problems still persist with the Sea Battalion, where the last shipments will be delivered in 2026. The planned Bundeswehr personnel increase poses a new challenge for the procurement and provision of the necessary personal equipment, which, along with clothing, must be available when every servicewoman or man joins the Bundeswehr. The armed forces should therefore already be procuring items with relatively long production times more quickly, i.e. as a matter of priority. It is important that the issuing of clothing and footwear run smoothly, especially to avoid any understandable dissatisfaction with recruits: • The clothing process with pretraining, for example, also had its issues here and there, because the number of recruits originally planned for the location by the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Personnel Management had increased significantly at short notice. The rigid induction dates on the first of each month and the resultant unfavourable planning in individual cases, can also produce frustration: • In the year under review, recruits started their service on Wednesday 1 October, and were sent home the very next day, the day before German Unity Day, without having received any uniform items.

German Bundestag – 21st electoral term – 41 – Printed paper 21/4200 It is of course understandable that it is not always possible to complete the entire clothing process in such a short time, but it would be helpful and would avoid annoyance with recruits full of expectation if this fact were clearly pointed out early on in the correspondence provided beforehand where possible. The digitalisation of the clothing system can make a significant contribution to ensuring improvement here, which is why the Bundeswehr logically began this process in 2024. In the year under review, Bw Bekleidungsmanagement GmbH identified various market-available technologies for digital outfitting with clothing and footwear, and trialled these in daytime operations for widespread use. The company is currently developing and testing an algorithm for the automated sizing of clothing items together with the Bundeswehr Research Institute for Materials, Fuels and Lubricants. The data required here is collected by six body scanners in the Bundeswehr. In future, the Bundeswehr plans to combine this algorithm with a mobile measuring solution and a corresponding app for recruits. The employees at the service points for issuing and trying clothing on will also benefit from the planned digitalisation. New software tested in the year under review will make the service more efficient and more attractive and, among other things, include the assignment of recruits to clothing and trying on points. A first version is already in use, and work is also underway on an online platform, which in the future recruits will be able to use to order and book the respective services. The platform went live at the end of the year under review with its first functions – access to individual clothing and equipment records and item replacement. In view of the planned Bundeswehr personnel increase in particular, this would appear to be the only available solution. How quickly and successfully the individual planned measures will be implemented remains to be seen. If clothing and personal equipment are worn out, servicewomen and men are obliged to return the items to the responsible Bw Bekleidungsmanagement GmbH service point for repair or replacement. This can cause problems with customised clothing and equipment items: • A 2.04 metre-tall serviceman had to hand in his custom-made waterproof protection gear without having any spare clothing. As the waiting times for a customised replacement can be quite long at times, he was severely impaired in the performance of his duties. The Ministry of Defence used the case as an opportunity to ensure that in future custom-made clothing items will only be handed over if an adequate replacement item is also available. This exception makes a lot of sense and ensures that those affected are provided the right equipment at all times. In a similar context, a specific suggestion for improvement was submitted to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces: • According to one serviceman, MOBAST use in everyday life results in rapid wear of individual parts, such as Velcro fasteners and cords. Instead of having to send MOBAST to the responsible service point’s repair service, he suggested adding these wear and tear parts to the personally available MOBAST repair kit. The Federal Ministry of Defence sees no need for this, as there were no complaints from the troops about excessive wear and tear. The repair kit for MOBAST 2.0 is also being adapted, and will include more individual parts in future, but whether or not this will actually produce a remedy remains to be seen. Clear communication is also decisive in preventing misunderstandings with the availabilities of clothing and equipment. The following example highlights the need for improvement here: • During a visit to the troops with 281 Communication and Information Systems Support Battalion, recruits complained about their lack of NBC individual protection. The Federal Ministry of Defence clarified that these items are generally available in sufficient quantities in the NBC Material Centre, and that contracts have already been concluded to supply further masks until 2027. The training centres must apply for this equipment for recruits, which apparently had not been done. Irrespective of the communication deficit, however, the fact that this important protective equipment is available in sufficient quantities is of course encouraging. The insufficient breathability of the mechanics coverall for aircraft engineering personnel has been the subject of petitions for many years. It is therefore good to hear that the Bundeswehr will now finally be procuring modernised mechanics clothing for the approximately 13,000 servicewomen and men affected. Delivery of the first items is planned for the end of 2026.

Printed paper 21/4200 – 42 – German Bundestag – 21st electoral term Service personnel receive training-specific personal protective equipment for certain training courses. It is of course unfortunate when it is not available in good time: • Before a training course for working with chainsaws, apart from cut-proof boots, the rest of the necessary protective equipment was missing. Participation in the course was only possible because the training centre happened to provide the required items itself, although most of them didn’t fit properly. To solve this recurring problem, the Federal Ministry of Defence plans to procure and stock all personal protective equipment items at a central location. Three out of four partial packages of this equipment will be delivered by the end of 2026. Drones The procurement and use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones, and defence against them were important topics for the Bundeswehr in the year under review. Numerous drone sightings over critical infrastructure and Bundeswehr sites are a real danger, which has intensified the debate on the responsibility for